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    <Metadata name="Content">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
    <Metadata name="Page_topic">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
    <Metadata name="Author">Marilee Mongello</Metadata>
    <Metadata name="Title">Secondary Sources: Queen Elizabeth by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892: Chapter X</Metadata>
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    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;7&quot;&gt;Queen Elizabeth&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
    &lt;font size=&quot;4&quot;&gt;by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;img border=&quot;2&quot; src=&quot;_httpdocimg_/eliz1-ermine.jpg&quot; width=&quot;400&quot; height=&quot;478&quot; alt=&quot;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas Hilliard&quot;&gt;&lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;i&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas 
    Hilliard;&lt;br&gt;from the &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=0&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fwww.marileecody.com%2feliz1-images.html&quot;&gt;Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I&lt;/a&gt; website&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
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      &lt;b&gt;CHAPTER X&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br&gt;
      &lt;b&gt;WAR WITH SPAIN: 1587-1603&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;ELIZABETH is not seen at her best in war. She did not easily 
    resign herself to its sacrifices. It frightened her to see the money which 
    she had painfully put together, pound by pound, during so many years, by 
    many a small economy, draining out at the rate of £17,000 a month into the 
    bottomless pit of military expenditure. When Leicester came back she simply 
    stopped all remittances to the Netherlands, making sure that if she did not 
    feed her soldiers some one else would have to do it. She saw that Parma was 
    not pressing forward. And though rumours of the enormous preparations in 
    Spain, which accounted for his inactivity, continued to pour in, she still 
    hoped that her intervention in the Netherlands was bending Philip to 
    concessions. All this time Parma was steadily carrying out his master's 
    plans for the invasion. His little army was to be trebled in the autumn by 
    reinforcements principally from Italy. In the meantime he was collecting a 
    flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. As soon as the Armada should appear they 
    were to make the passage under its protection. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It would answer no useful purpose, even if my limits 
    permitted it, to enter into the particulars of Elizabeth's policy towards 
    the United Provinces during the twelve months that preceded the appearance 
    of the Armada. Her proceedings were often tortuous, and by setting them 
    forth in minute detail her detractors have not found it difficult to 
    represent them as treacherous. But, living three centuries later, what have 
    we to consider but the general scope and drift of her policy? Looking at it 
    as a whole we shall find that, whether we approve of it or not, it was 
    simple, consistent, and undisguised. She had no intention of abandoning the 
    Provinces to Philip, still less of betraying them. But she did wish them to 
    return to their allegiance, if she could procure for them proper guarantees 
    for such liberties as they had been satisfied with before Philip's tyranny 
    began. If Philip had been wise he would have made those concessions. 
    Elizabeth is not to be over-much blamed if she clung too long to the belief 
    that he could be persuaded or compelled to do what was so much for his own 
    interest. If she was deceived so was Burghley. Walsingham is entitled to the 
    credit of having from first to last refused to believe that the negotiations 
    were anything but a blind. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Though Elizabeth desired peace, she did not cease to deal 
    blows at Philip. In the spring of 1587 (April-June), while she was most 
    earnestly pushing her negotiations with Parma, she despatched Drake on a new 
    expedition to the Spanish coast. He forced his way into the harbours of 
    Cadiz and Corunna, destroyed many ships and immense stores, and came back 
    loaded with plunder. The Armada had not been crippled, for most of the ships 
    that were to compose it were lying in the Tagus. But the concentration had 
    been delayed. Fresh stores had to be collected. Drake calculated, and as it 
    proved rightly, that another season at least would be consumed in repairing 
    the loss, and that England, for that summer and autumn, could rest secure of 
    invasion. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The delay was most unwelcome to Philip. The expense of 
    keeping such a fleet and army on foot through the winter would be enormous. 
    Spain was maintaining not only the Armada but the army of Parma; for the 
    resources of the Netherlands, which had been the true El Dorado of the 
    Spanish monarchy, were completely dried up. So impatient was Philip 
    --usually the slowest of men--that he proposed to despatch the Armada even 
    in September, and actually wrote to Parma that he might expect it at any 
    moment. But, as Drake had calculated, September was gone before everything 
    was ready. The naval experts protested against the rashness of facing the 
    autumnal gales, with no friendly harbour on either side of the Channel in 
    which to take refuge. Philip then made the absurd suggestion that the army 
    from the Netherlands should cross by itself in its flat-bottomed boats. But 
    Parma told him that it was absolutely out of the question. Four English 
    ships could sink the whole flotilla. In the meantime his soldiers, waiting 
    on the Dunkirk Downs and exposed to the severities of the weather, were 
    dying off like flies. Philip and Elizabeth resembled one another in this, 
    that neither of them had any personal experience of war either by land or 
    sea. For a Queen this was natural. For a King it was unnatural, and for an 
    ambitious King unprecedented. They did not understand the proper adaptation 
    of means to ends. Yet it was necessary to obtain their sanction before 
    anything could be done. Hence there was much mismanagement on both sides. 
    Still England was in no real danger during the summer and autumn of 1587, 
    because Philip's preparations were not completed; and before the end of the 
    year the English fleet was lying in the Channel. But the Queen grudged the 
    expense of keeping the crews up to their full complement. The supply of 
    provisions and ammunition was also very inadequate. The expensiveness of war 
    is generally a sufficient reason for not going to war; but to attempt to do 
    war cheaply is always unwise. &amp;quot;Sparing and war,&amp;quot; as Effingham observed, 
    &amp;quot;have no affinity together.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Drake strongly urged that, instead of trying to guard the 
    Channel, the English fleet should make for the coast of Spain, and boldly 
    assail the Armada as soon as it put to sea. This was the advice of a man who 
    had all the shining qualities of Nelson, and seems to have been in no 
    respect his inferior. It was no counsel of desperation. He was confident of 
    success. Lord Howard of Effingham, the Admiral, was of the same opinion. The 
    negotiations were odious to him. For Burghley, who clings to them, he has no 
    more reverence than Hamlet had for Polonius. &amp;quot;Since England was England,&amp;quot; he 
    writes to Walsingham, &amp;quot;there was never such a stratagem and mask to deceive 
    her as this treaty of peace. I pray God that we do not curse for this a long 
    grey beard with a white head witless, that will make all the world think us 
    heartless. You know whom I mean.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;With the hopes and fears of these sea-heroes, it is 
    instructive to compare the forecast of the great soldier who was to conduct 
    the invasion. Always obedient and devoted to his sovereign, Parma played his 
    part in the deceptive negotiations with consummate skill. But his own 
    opinion was that it would be wise to negotiate in good faith and accept the 
    English terms. Though prepared to undertake the invasion, he took a very 
    serious view of the risks to be encountered. He tells Philip that the 
    English preparations are formidable both by land and sea. Even if the 
    passage should be safely accomplished, disembarkation would be difficult. 
    His army, reduced by the hardships of the winter from 30,000 men, which he 
    had estimated as the proper number, to less than 17,000, was dangerously 
    small for the work expected of it. He would have to fight battle after 
    battle, and the further he advanced the weaker would his army become both 
    from losses and from the necessity of protecting his communications. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Parma had carefully informed himself of the preparations in 
    England. From the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, attention had been paid to 
    the organisation, training, and equipment of the militia, and especially 
    since the relations with Spain had become more hostile. On paper it seems to 
    have amounted to 117,000 men. Mobilisation was a local business. Sir John 
    Norris drew up the plan of defence. Beacon fires did the work of the 
    telegraph. Every man knew whither he was to repair when their blaze should 
    be seen. The districts to be abandoned, the positions to be defended, the 
    bridges to be broken, were all marked out. Three armies, calculated to 
    amount in the aggregate to 73,000 men, were ordered to assemble in July. 
    Whether so many were actually mustered is doubtful. But Parma would 
    certainly have found himself confronted by forces vastly superior in numbers 
    to his own, and would have had, as he said, to fight battle after battle. 
    The bow had not been entirely abandoned, but the greater part of the 
    archers--two-thirds in some counties--had lately been armed with calivers. 
    What was wanting in discipline would have been to some extent made up by the 
    spontaneous cohesion of a force organised under its natural leaders, the 
    nobles and gentry of each locality, not a few of whom had seen service 
    abroad. But, after all, the greatest element of strength was the free spirit 
    of the people. England was, and had long been, a nation of freemen. There 
    were a few peers, and a great many knights and gentlemen. But there was no 
    noble caste, as on the Continent, separated by an impassable barrier of 
    birth and privilege from the mass of the people. All felt themselves 
    fellow-countrymen bound together by common sentiments, common interests, and 
    mutual respect. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;This spirit of freedom--one might almost say of 
    equality--made itself felt still more in the navy, and goes far to account 
    for the cheerful energy and dash with which every service was performed. 
    &amp;quot;The English officers lived on terms of sympathy with their men unknown to 
    the Spaniards, who raised between the commander and the commanded absurd 
    barriers of rank and blood which forbade to his pride any labour but that of 
    fighting. Drake touched the true mainspring of English success when he once 
    (in his voyage round the world) indignantly rebuked some coxcomb 
    gentlemen-adventurers with, 'I should like to see the gentleman that will 
    refuse to set his hand to a rope. I must have the gentlemen to hale and draw 
    with the mariners.&amp;quot; Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher were all born of humble 
    parents. They rose by their own valour and capacity. They had gentlemen of 
    birth serving under them. To Howard and Cumberland and Seymour they were 
    brothers-in-arms. The master of every little trading vessel was fired by 
    their example, and hoped to climb as high. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It is the pleasure of some writers to speak of Elizabeth's 
    naval preparations as disgracefully insufficient, and to treat the 
    triumphant result as a sort of miracle. To their apprehension, indeed, her 
    whole reign is one long interference by Providence with the ordinary 
    relations of cause and effect. The number of royal ships as compared with 
    those of private owners in the fleet which met the great Armada-34 to 
    161--is represented as discreditably small. By Englishmen of that day, it 
    was considered to be. creditably large. Sir Edward Coke (who was thirtyeight 
    at the time of the Armada), writing under Charles I., when the royal navy 
    was much larger, says: &amp;quot;In the reign of Queen Elizabeth (I being then 
    acquainted with this business) there were thirty-three [royal ships] besides 
    pinnaces, which so guarded and regarded the navigation of the merchants, as 
    they had safe vent for their commodities, and trade and traffic flourished.&amp;quot;&lt;a onclick=&quot;return pageTxt_href_onClick(this,true);&quot; href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fbeeslychapterten.html#2&quot;&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It seems to be overlooked that the royal navy, such as it 
    was, was almost the creation of Elizabeth. Her father was the first English 
    king who made any attempt to keep a standing navy of his own. He established 
    the Admiralty and the first royal dockyard. Under Edward and Mary the navy, 
    like everything else, went to ruin. Elizabeth's ship-building, humble as it 
    seems to us, excited the admiration of her subjects, and was regarded as one 
    of the chief advances of her reign. The ships, when not in commission, were 
    kept in the Medway. The Queen personally paid the greatest attention to 
    them. They were always kept in excellent condition, and could be fitted out 
    for sea at very short notice. Economy was enforced in this, as in other 
    departments, but not at the expense of efficiency. The wages of officers and 
    men were very much augmented; but in the short periods for which crews were 
    enlisted, and in the victualling, there seems to have been unwise parsimony 
    in 1588. The grumbling of alarmists about unpreparedness, apathy, 
    stinginess, and red-tape was precisely what it is in our own day. We know 
    that some allowance is to be made for it. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The movements of the Armada were perfectly well known in 
    England, and all the dispositions to meet it at sea were completed in a 
    leisurely manner. Conferences were still going on at Ostend between English 
    and Spanish commissioners. On the part of Elizabeth there was sincerity, but 
    not blind credulity nor any disposition to make unworthy concessions. 
    Conferences quite as protracted have often been held between belligerents 
    while hostilities were being actively carried on. The large majority of 
    Englishmen were resolved to fight to the death against any invader. But, as 
    against Spain, there was not that eager pugnacity which a war with France 
    always called forth, except, perhaps, among the sea-rovers; and even they 
    would have contented themselves, if it had been possible, with the 
    unrecognized privateering which had so long given them the profits of war 
    with the immunities of peace. The rest of the nation respected their Queen 
    for her persevering endeavour to find a way of reconciliation with an 
    ancient ally, and to limit, in the meantime, the area of hostilities. They 
    were confident, and with good reason, that she would surrender no important 
    interest, and that aggressive designs would be met, as they had always been 
    met, more than half-way. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The story of the great victory is too well known to need 
    repetition here. But some comments are necessary. It is usual, for one 
    reason or other, to exaggerate the disparity of the opposing fleets, and to 
    represent England as only saved from impending ruin by the extraordinary 
    daring of her seamen, and a series of fortunate accidents. The final 
    destruction of the Armada, after the pursuit was over, was certainly the 
    work of wind and sea. But if we fairly weigh the available strength on each 
    side, we shall see that the English commanders might from the first feel, as 
    they did feel, a reasonable assurance of defeating the invaders. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Let us first compare the strength of the fleets: &lt;i&gt;--I will 
    insert this graphic as soon as possible--Marilee&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The Armada carried besides 21,855 soldiers. The first thing 
    that strikes us is the immense preponderance in tonnage on the part of the 
    Spaniards, and in sailors on the part of the English. This really goes far 
    to explain the result. Nothing is more certain than that the Spanish ships, 
    notwithstanding their superior size, were for fighting and sailing purposes 
    very inferior to the English. It had always been believed that, to withstand 
    the heavy seas of the Atlantic, a ship should be constructed like a lofty 
    fortress. The English builders were introducing lower and longer hulls and a 
    greater spread of canvas. Their crews, as has always been the case in oar 
    navy, were equally handy as sailors and gunners. The Spanish ships were 
    under-manned. The soldiers were not accustomed to work the guns, and were of 
    no use unless it came to boarding, which Howard ordered his captains to 
    avoid. The English guns, if fewer than the Spanish, were heavier and worked 
    by more practised men. Their balls not only cut up the rigging of the 
    Spaniards but tore their hulls (which were supposed to be cannon-proof), 
    while the English ships were hardly touched. The slaughter among the 
    wretched soldiers crowded between decks was terrible. Blood was seen pouring 
    out of the leescuppers. &amp;quot;The English ships,&amp;quot; says a Spanish officer, &amp;quot;were 
    under such good management that they did with them what they pleased.&amp;quot; The 
    work was done almost entirely by the Queen's ships.&amp;quot; If you had seen,&amp;quot; says 
    Sir William Winter, &amp;quot;the simple service done by the merchants and coast 
    ships, you would have said we had been little helped by them, otherwise than 
    that they did make a show.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The principal and final battle was fought off Gravelines.
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    The Armada therefore did arrive at its destination, but only to show that 
    the general plan of the invasion was an impracticable one. The superiority 
    in tonnage and number of guns on the morning of that day, though not what it 
    had been when the fighting began a week before, was still immense, if 
    superiority in those particulars had been of any use. But with this battle 
    the plan of Philip was finally shattered. So far from being in a condition 
    to cover Parma's passage, the Spanish admiral was glad to escape as best he 
    could from the English pursuit. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;During the eight days' fight, be it observed, the Armada had 
    experienced no unfavourable weather or other stroke of ill-fortune. The wind 
    had been mostly in the west, and not tempestuous. After the last battle, 
    when the crippled Spanish ships were drifting upon the Dutch shoals, it 
    opportunely shifted, and enabled them to escape into the North Sea. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It would not be easy to find any great naval engagement in 
    which the victors suffered so little. In the last battle, when they came to 
    close quarters, they had about sixty killed. During the first seven days 
    their loss seems to have been almost nil. One vessel only-not belonging to 
    the Queen--became entangled among the enemy, and succumbed. Except the 
    master of this vessel not one of the captains was killed from first to last. 
    Many men of rank were serving in the fleet. It
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    is not mentioned that one of them was so much as wounded. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Looking at all these facts, we can surely come to only one 
    conclusion. Philip's plan was hopeless from the first. Barring accidents, 
    the English were bound to win. On no other occasion in our history was our 
    country so well prepared to meet her enemies. Never was her safety from 
    invasion so amply guaranteed. The defeat of the Great Armada was the 
    deserved and crowning triumph of thirty years of good government at home and 
    wise policy abroad; of careful provision for defence and sober abstinence 
    from adventure and aggression. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Of the land preparations it is impossible to speak with 
    equal confidence, as they were never put to the test. If the Spaniards had 
    landed, Leicester's militia would no doubt have experienced a bloody defeat. 
    London might have been taken and plundered. But Parma himself never expected 
    to become master of the country without the aid of a great Catholic rising. 
    This, we may affirm with confidence, would not have taken place on even the 
    smallest scale. Overwhelming forces would soon have gathered round the 
    Spaniards. They would probably have retired to the coast, and there 
    fortified some place from which it would have been difficult to dislodge 
    them as long as they retained the command of the sea. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Such seems to have been the utmost success which, in the 
    most favourable event, could have attended the invasion. A great disaster, 
    no doubt, for England, and one for which Elizabeth would have been judged by 
    history with more severity than justice; for Englishmen have always chosen 
    to risk it, down to our own time.(1) No government which insisted on making 
    adequate provision for the military defence of the country would have been 
    tolerated then, or, to all appearance, would be tolerated now. We have 
    always trusted to our navy. It were to be wished that our naval superiority 
    were as assured now as when we defeated the Armada. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The arrangements for feeding the soldiers and sailors were 
    very defective. A praiseworthy system of control had been introduced to 
    check waste and peculation in time of peace. Of course it did not easily 
    adapt itself to the exigencies of war. Military operations are sure to 
    suffer where a certain, or rather uncertain, amount of waste and peculation 
    is not risked. We have not forgotten the &amp;quot;horrible and heart-rending&amp;quot; 
    sufferings of our army in the Crimea, which, like those of Elizabeth's 
    fleet, had to be relieved by private effort. In the sixteenth century the 
    lot of the soldier and sailor everywhere was want and disease, varied at 
    intervals by plunder and excess. Philip's soldiers and sailors were worse 
    off than Elizabeth's, though he grudged no money for purposes of war. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Those who profess to be scandalised by the appointment of 
    Leicester to the command of the army should point out what fitter choice 
    could have been made. He was the only great nobleman with any military 
    experience; and to suppose that any one but a great nobleman could have been 
    appointed to such a command is to show a profound ignorance of the ideas of 
    the time. He had Sir John Norris, a really able soldier, as his marshal of 
    the camp. After all, no one has alleged that he did not do his duty with 
    energy and intelligence. The story that the Queen thought of making him her 
    &amp;quot;Lieutenant in the government of England and Ireland,&amp;quot; but was dissuaded 
    from it by Burghley and Hatton, rests on no authority but that of Camden, 
    who is fond of repeating spiteful gossip about Leicester. No sensible person 
    will believe that she meant to create a sort of Grand Vizier. She may have 
    thought of making him what we should call &amp;quot;Commander-in-Chief.&amp;quot; There would 
    be much to say for such a concentration of authority while the kingdom was 
    threatened with invasion. The title of &amp;quot;Lieutenant&amp;quot; was a purely military 
    one, and began to be applied under the Tudors to the commanders of the 
    militia in each county. Leicester's title for the time was &amp;quot;Lieutenant and 
    Captain-General of the Queen's armies and companies.&amp;quot; But we find him 
    complaining to Walsingham that the patent of Hunsdon, the commander of the 
    Midland army, gave him independent powers. &amp;quot;I shall have wrong if he 
    absolutely command where my patent doth give me power. You may easily 
    conceive what absurd dealings are likely to fall out if you allow two 
    absolute commanders&amp;quot; (28 July). Camden's story is probably a confused echo 
    of this dispute. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Writers who are loth to admit that the trust, the gratitude, 
    the enthusiastic loyalty which Elizabeth inspired were the first and most 
    important cause of the great victory, have sought to belittle the grandest 
    moment of her life by pointing out that the famous speech at Tilbury was 
    made after the battle of Gravelines. But the dispersal of the Armada by the 
    storm of August 5th was not yet known in England. Drake, writing on the 8th 
    and 10th, thinks that it is gone to Denmark to refit, and begs the Queen not 
    to diminish any of her forces. The occasion of the speech on the 10th seems 
    to have been the arrival of a post on that day, while the Queen was at 
    dinner in Leicester's tent, with a false alarm that Parma had embarked all 
    his forces, and might be expected in England immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;But the Lieutenant-General had reached the end of his 
    career. Three weeks after the Tilbury review he died of &amp;quot;a continued fever,&amp;quot; 
    at the age of fifty-six. He kept Elizabeth's regard to the last, because she 
    believed--and during the latter part of his life, not wrongly--in his 
    fidelity and devotion. There is no sign that she at any time valued his 
    judgment or suffered him to sway her policy, except so far as he was the 
    mouthpiece of abler advisers; nor did she ever allow his enmities, violent 
    as they were, to prejudice her against any of her other servants. His 
    fortune was no doubt much above his deserts, and he has paid the usual 
    penalty. There are few personages in history about whom so much malicious 
    nonsense has been written. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;We cannot help looking on England as placed in a quite new 
    position by the defeat of the Armada--a position of security and 
    independence. In truth, what was changed was not so much the relative 
    strength of England and Spain as the opinion of it held by Englishmen and 
    Spaniards, and indeed by all Europe. The loss to Philip in mere ships, men, 
    and treasure was no doubt considerable. But his inability to conquer England 
    was demonstrated rather than caused by the destruction of the Armada. Philip 
    himself talked loftily about &amp;quot;placing another fleet upon the seas.&amp;quot; But his 
    subjects began to see that defence, not conquest, was now their 
    business--and had been for some time if they had only known it: &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;blockquote&gt;
      &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Cervi, luporum preda rapacium,&lt;br&gt;
      Sectamur ultro quos opimus&lt;br&gt;
      Fallere et effugere eat triumphus&lt;/i&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/blockquote&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth's attitude to Philip underwent a marked change. 
    Till then she had been unwilling to abandon the hope of a peaceful 
    settlement. She had dealt him not a few stinging blows, but always with a 
    certain restraint and forbearance, because they were meant for the purpose 
    of bringing him to reason. Thirty years of patience on his part had led her 
    to believe that he would never carry retaliation beyond assassination plots. 
    At last, in his slow way, he had gathered up all his strength and essayed to 
    crush her. Thenceforward she was a convert to Drake's doctrine that attack 
    was the surest way of defence. She had still good reasons for devolving this 
    work as much as possible on the private enterprise of her subjects. The 
    burden fell on those who asked nothing better than to be allowed to bear it. 
    Thus arose that system, or rather practice, of leaving national work to be 
    executed by private enterprise, which has had so much to do with the 
    building up of the British Empire. Private gain has been the mainspring of 
    action. National defence and aggrandisement have been almost incidental 
    results. With Elizabeth herself national and private aims could not be 
    dissevered. The nation and she had but one purse. She was cheaply defending 
    England, and she shared in the plunder. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The favourite cruising-ground of the English adventurers was 
    off the Azores, where the Spanish treasure fleets always halted for fresh 
    water and provisions, on their way to Europe. Some of these expeditions were 
    on a large scale. But they were not so successful or profitable, in 
    proportion to their size, as the smaller ventures of Drake and Hawkins 
    earlier in the reign. The Spaniards were everywhere on the alert. The 
    harbours of the New World, which formerly lay in careless security, were put 
    into a state of defence. Treasure fleets made their voyages with more 
    caution. &amp;quot;Not a grain of gold, silver, or pearl, but what must be got 
    through the fire.&amp;quot; The day of great prizes was gone by. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Two of these expeditions are distinguished by their 
    importance. The first was a joint-stock venture of Drake and Norris--the 
    foremost sailor and the foremost soldier among Englishmen of that day--in 
    the year after the great Armada (April 1589). They and some private backers 
    found most of the capital. The Queen contributed six royal ships and 
    £20,000. This fleet carried no less than 11,000 soldiers, for the aim was to 
    wrest Portugal from the Spaniard and set up Don Antonio, a representative of 
    the dethroned dynasty. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Stopping on their way at Corunna, they took the lower town, 
    destroyed large stores, and defeated in the field a much superior force 
    marching to the relief of the place. Norris mined and breached the walls of 
    the upper town; but the storming parties having been repulsed with great 
    loss, the army re-embarked and pursued its voyage. Landing at Peniché, 
    Norris marched fifty miles by Vimiero and Torres Vedras, names famous 
    afterwards in the military annals of England, and on the seventh day arrived 
    before Lisbon. But he had no battering train; for Drake, who had brought the 
    fleet round to the mouth of the Tagus, judged it dangerous to enter the 
    river. Nor did the Portuguese rise, as had been hoped. The army therefore, 
    marching through the suburbs of Lisbon, rejoined the fleet at Cascaes, and 
    proceeded to Vigo. That town was burnt, and the surrounding country 
    plundered. This was the last exploit of the expedition. Great loss and 
    dishonour had been inflicted on Spain; but no less than half of the soldiers 
    and sailors had perished by disease; and the booty, though said to have been 
    large, was a disappointment to the survivors. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The other great expedition was in 1596. The capture of 
    Calais in April of that year by the Spaniards, had renewed the alarm of 
    invasion, and it was determined to meet the danger at a distance from home. 
    A great fleet, with 6000 soldiers on board, commanded by Essex and Howard of 
    Effingham sailed straight to Cadiz, the principal port and arsenal of Spain. 
    The harbour was forced by the fleet, the town and castle stormed by the 
    army, several men-of-war taken or destroyed, a large merchant-fleet burnt, 
    together with an immense quantity of stores and merchandise; the total value 
    being estimated at twenty millions of ducats. This was by far the heaviest 
    blow inflicted by England upon Spain during the reign, and was so regarded 
    in Europe; for though the great Armada had been signally defeated by the 
    English fleet, its subsequent destruction was due to the winds and waves. 
    Essex was vehemently desirous to hold Cadiz; but Effingham and the Council 
    of War appointed by the Queen would not hear of it. The expedition 
    accordingly returned home, having effectually relieved England from the fear 
    of invasion. The burning of Penzance by four Spanish galleys (1595) was not 
    much to set against these great successes. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;One reason for the comparative impunity with which the 
    English assailed the unwieldy empire of Philip was the insane pursuit of the 
    French crown, to which he devoted all his resources after the murder of 
    Henry III. In 1598, with one foot in the grave, and no longer able to 
    conceal from himself that, with the exception of the conquest of Portugal, 
    all the ambitious schemes of his life had failed, he was fain to conclude 
    the peace of Vervins with Henry IV. Henry was ready to insist that England 
    and the United Provinces should be comprehended in the treaty. Philip 
    offered terms which Elizabeth would have welcomed ten years earlier. He 
    proposed that the whole of the Low Countries should be constituted a 
    separate sovereignty under his son-in-law the Archduke Albert. The Dutch, 
    who were prospering in war as well as in trade, scouted the offer. English 
    feeling was divided. There was a war-party headed by Essex and Raleigh, 
    personally bitter enemies, but both athirst for glory, conquest, and empire, 
    believing in no right but that of the strongest, greedy for wealth, and 
    disdaining the slower, more laborious, and more legitimate modes of 
    acquiring it. They were tired of campaigning it in France and the Low 
    Countries, where hard knocks and beggarly plunder were all that a soldier 
    had to look to. They proposed to carry a great English army across the 
    Atlantic, to occupy permanently the isthmus of Panama, and from that central 
    position to wrestle with the Spaniard for the trade and plunder of the New 
    World. The peace party held that these ambitious schemes would bring no 
    profit except possibly to a few individuals; that the treasury would be 
    exhausted and the country irritated by taxation and the pressing of 
    soldiers; that to re-establish the old commercial intercourse with Spain 
    would be more reputable and attended with more solid advantage to the nation 
    at large; and finally, that the English arms would be much better employed 
    in a thorough conquest of Ireland. These were the views of Burghley; and 
    they were strongly supported by Buckhurst, the best of the younger statesmen 
    who now surrounded Elizabeth. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth always encouraged her ministers to speak their 
    minds; but, as Buckhurst said on this occasion, &amp;quot;when they have done their 
    extreme duty she wills what she wills.&amp;quot; She determined to maintain the 
    treaty of 1585 with the Dutch. but she took the opportunity of getting it 
    amended in such a way as to throw upon them a larger share of the expenses 
    of the war, and to provide more definitely for the ultimate repayment of her 
    advances. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;We have seen that three years before the Armada Elizabeth 
    had lost the French alliance, which had till then been the key-stone of her 
    policy. Since then, though aware that Henry III. wished her well, and that 
    he would thwart the Spanish faction as much as he dared, she had not been 
    able to count on him. He might at any moment be pushed by Guise into an 
    attack on England, either with or without the concurrence of Spain. The 
    accession, therefore, of Henry IV. afforded her great relief. In him she had 
    a sure ally. It is true that, like her other allies the Dutch, he was more 
    in a condition to require help than to afford it. But the more work she 
    provided for Philip in Holland or France, the safer England would be. The 
    armies of the Holy League might be formidable to Henry; but as long as he 
    could hold them at bay they were not dangerous to England. She had never 
    quite got over her scruple about helping the Dutch against their lawful 
    sovereign. But Henry IV. was the legitimate King of France, and she could 
    heartily aid him to put down his rebels. From 2000 to 5000 English troops 
    were therefore constantly serving in France down to the peace of Vervins.
    &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Philip, in defiance of the Salic law, claimed the crown of 
    France for his daughter in right of her mother, who was a sister of Henry 
    III. To Brittany he alleged that she had a special claim, as being descended 
    from Anne of Brittany, which the Bourbons were not. Brittany, therefore, he 
    invaded at once by sea. Elizabeth, alarmed by the proximity of this Spanish 
    force, desired that her troops in France should be employed in expelling it, 
    and that they should be vigorously supported by Henry IV. Henry, on the 
    other hand, was always drawing away the English to serve his more pressing 
    needs in other parts of France. This brought upon him many harsh rebukes and 
    threats from the English Queen. But she had, for the first time, met her 
    match. He judged, and rightly, that she would not desert him. So, with 
    oft-repeated apologies, light promises, and well-turned compliments, he just 
    went on doing what suited him best, getting all the fighting he could out of 
    the English, and airily eluding Elizabeth's repeated demands for some coast 
    town, which could be held, like Brill and Flushing, as a security for her 
    heavy subsidies. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;When Henry was reconciled to the Catholic Church, Elizabeth 
    went through the form of expressing surprise and regret at a step which she 
    must have long expected, and must have felt to be wise (1593). Her alliance 
    with Henry was not shaken. It was drawn even closer by a new treaty, each 
    sovereign engaging not to make peace without the consent of the other. This 
    engagement did not prevent Henry from concluding the separate peace of 
    Vervins five years later, when he judged that his interest required it 
    (1598). Elizabeth's dissatisfaction was, this time, genuine enough. But 
    Henry was no longer her protégé, a homeless, landless, penniless king, 
    depending on English subsidies, roaming over the realm he called his own 
    with a few thousands, or sometimes hundreds, of undisciplined cavaliers, who 
    gathered and dispersed at their own pleasure. He was master of a re-united 
    France, and could no longer be either patronised or threatened. Elizabeth 
    might expostulate, and declare that &amp;quot;if there was such a sin as that against 
    the Holy Ghost it must needs be ingratitude:&amp;quot; gratitude was a sentiment to 
    which she was as much a stranger as Henry. The only difference between them 
    was the national one: the Englishwoman preached; the Frenchman mocked. What 
    made her so sore was that he had, so to speak, stolen her policy from her. 
    His predecessor had always suspected her--and with good reason--of intending 
    &amp;quot;to draw her neck out of the collar&amp;quot; if once she could induce him to 
    undertake a joint war. The joint war had at length been undertaken by Henry 
    IV., and it was he who had managed to slip out of it first, while Elizabeth, 
    who longed for peace, was obliged to stand by the Dutch. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The two sovereigns, however, knew their own interests too 
    well to quarrel. Henry gave Elizabeth to understand that his designs against 
    Spain had undergone no change; he was only halting for breath; he would help 
    the Dutch underhand--just what she used to say to Henry III. She had now to 
    deal with a French King as sagacious as herself, and a great deal more 
    prompt and vigorous in action; not the man to be made a cat's-paw by any 
    one. She had to accept him as a partner, if not on her own terms, then on 
    his. Both sovereigns were thoroughly veracious--in Carlyle's sense of the 
    word. That is to say, their policy was determined not by passion, or vanity, 
    or sentiment of any kind, but by enlightened self-interest, and was 
    therefore calculable by those who knew how to calculate. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
    &lt;hr&gt;
    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Notes: &lt;/b&gt;1.
    &lt;/font&gt;
    &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot;&gt;The Earl of Sussex, after 
    inspecting the preparations for defence in Hampshire towards the end of 
    1587, writes to the Council that he had found nothing ready. The &amp;quot;better 
    sort&amp;quot; said, &amp;quot;We are much charged many ways, and when the enemy comes we will 
    provide for him; but he will not come yet.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;From &lt;i&gt;
    Queen Elizabeth&lt;/i&gt; by Edward Spencer Beesly.&amp;nbsp; Published in London by 
    Macmillan and Co., 1892.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;
  &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fbeeslychaptereleven.html&quot;&gt;to Chapter 
    XI: Domestic Affairs: 1588-1601&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fmonarchs%2feliz1.html&quot;&gt;to the Queen 
    Elizabeth I website&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp; /&amp;nbsp;
    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2frelative%2fmaryqos.html&quot;&gt;to the Mary, 
    queen of Scots website&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fsecondary.html&quot;&gt;
    to Secondary Sources&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
  


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