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| 4 | <meta name="content" content="biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892">
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| 6 | <meta name="author" content="Marilee Mongello">
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| 11 | <title>Secondary Sources: Queen Elizabeth by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892:
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| 12 | Chapter X</title>
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| 33 | <td width="25%" height="610"></td>
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| 34 | <td valign="top" width="50%" height="610">
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| 35 | <p align="center"><b><font size="7">Queen Elizabeth<br></font></b>
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| 36 | <font size="4">by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</font></p>
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| 37 | <p align="center">
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| 38 | <img border="2" src="eliz1-ermine.jpg" width="400" height="478" alt="'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas Hilliard"><p align="center">
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| 39 | <i><font size="2">'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas
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| 40 | Hilliard;<br>from the <a href="http://www.marileecody.com/eliz1-images.html">Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I</a> website</font></i></td>
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| 41 | <td width="25%" height="610"></td>
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| 42 | </tr>
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| 43 | </table>
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| 44 | <blockquote>
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| 45 | <blockquote>
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| 53 | <div align="left">
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| 54 | <b>CHAPTER X</b><br>
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| 55 | <b>WAR WITH SPAIN: 1587-1603</b></div>
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| 56 | <p align="left">ELIZABETH is not seen at her best in war. She did not easily
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| 57 | resign herself to its sacrifices. It frightened her to see the money which
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| 58 | she had painfully put together, pound by pound, during so many years, by
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| 59 | many a small economy, draining out at the rate of £17,000 a month into the
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| 60 | bottomless pit of military expenditure. When Leicester came back she simply
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| 61 | stopped all remittances to the Netherlands, making sure that if she did not
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| 62 | feed her soldiers some one else would have to do it. She saw that Parma was
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| 63 | not pressing forward. And though rumours of the enormous preparations in
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| 64 | Spain, which accounted for his inactivity, continued to pour in, she still
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| 65 | hoped that her intervention in the Netherlands was bending Philip to
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| 66 | concessions. All this time Parma was steadily carrying out his master's
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| 67 | plans for the invasion. His little army was to be trebled in the autumn by
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| 68 | reinforcements principally from Italy. In the meantime he was collecting a
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| 69 | flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. As soon as the Armada should appear they
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| 70 | were to make the passage under its protection. </p>
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| 71 | <p align="left">It would answer no useful purpose, even if my limits
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| 72 | permitted it, to enter into the particulars of Elizabeth's policy towards
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| 73 | the United Provinces during the twelve months that preceded the appearance
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| 74 | of the Armada. Her proceedings were often tortuous, and by setting them
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| 75 | forth in minute detail her detractors have not found it difficult to
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| 76 | represent them as treacherous. But, living three centuries later, what have
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| 77 | we to consider but the general scope and drift of her policy? Looking at it
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| 78 | as a whole we shall find that, whether we approve of it or not, it was
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| 79 | simple, consistent, and undisguised. She had no intention of abandoning the
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| 80 | Provinces to Philip, still less of betraying them. But she did wish them to
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| 81 | return to their allegiance, if she could procure for them proper guarantees
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| 82 | for such liberties as they had been satisfied with before Philip's tyranny
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| 83 | began. If Philip had been wise he would have made those concessions.
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| 84 | Elizabeth is not to be over-much blamed if she clung too long to the belief
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| 85 | that he could be persuaded or compelled to do what was so much for his own
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| 86 | interest. If she was deceived so was Burghley. Walsingham is entitled to the
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| 87 | credit of having from first to last refused to believe that the negotiations
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| 88 | were anything but a blind. </p>
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| 89 | <p align="left">Though Elizabeth desired peace, she did not cease to deal
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| 90 | blows at Philip. In the spring of 1587 (April-June), while she was most
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| 91 | earnestly pushing her negotiations with Parma, she despatched Drake on a new
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| 92 | expedition to the Spanish coast. He forced his way into the harbours of
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| 93 | Cadiz and Corunna, destroyed many ships and immense stores, and came back
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| 94 | loaded with plunder. The Armada had not been crippled, for most of the ships
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| 95 | that were to compose it were lying in the Tagus. But the concentration had
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| 96 | been delayed. Fresh stores had to be collected. Drake calculated, and as it
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| 97 | proved rightly, that another season at least would be consumed in repairing
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| 98 | the loss, and that England, for that summer and autumn, could rest secure of
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| 99 | invasion. </p>
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| 100 | <p align="left">The delay was most unwelcome to Philip. The expense of
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| 101 | keeping such a fleet and army on foot through the winter would be enormous.
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| 102 | Spain was maintaining not only the Armada but the army of Parma; for the
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| 103 | resources of the Netherlands, which had been the true El Dorado of the
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| 104 | Spanish monarchy, were completely dried up. So impatient was Philip
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| 105 | --usually the slowest of men--that he proposed to despatch the Armada even
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| 106 | in September, and actually wrote to Parma that he might expect it at any
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| 107 | moment. But, as Drake had calculated, September was gone before everything
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| 108 | was ready. The naval experts protested against the rashness of facing the
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| 109 | autumnal gales, with no friendly harbour on either side of the Channel in
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| 110 | which to take refuge. Philip then made the absurd suggestion that the army
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| 111 | from the Netherlands should cross by itself in its flat-bottomed boats. But
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| 112 | Parma told him that it was absolutely out of the question. Four English
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| 113 | ships could sink the whole flotilla. In the meantime his soldiers, waiting
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| 114 | on the Dunkirk Downs and exposed to the severities of the weather, were
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| 115 | dying off like flies. Philip and Elizabeth resembled one another in this,
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| 116 | that neither of them had any personal experience of war either by land or
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| 117 | sea. For a Queen this was natural. For a King it was unnatural, and for an
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| 118 | ambitious King unprecedented. They did not understand the proper adaptation
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| 119 | of means to ends. Yet it was necessary to obtain their sanction before
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| 120 | anything could be done. Hence there was much mismanagement on both sides.
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| 121 | Still England was in no real danger during the summer and autumn of 1587,
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| 122 | because Philip's preparations were not completed; and before the end of the
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| 123 | year the English fleet was lying in the Channel. But the Queen grudged the
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| 124 | expense of keeping the crews up to their full complement. The supply of
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| 125 | provisions and ammunition was also very inadequate. The expensiveness of war
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| 126 | is generally a sufficient reason for not going to war; but to attempt to do
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| 127 | war cheaply is always unwise. "Sparing and war," as Effingham observed,
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| 128 | "have no affinity together." </p>
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| 129 | <p align="left">Drake strongly urged that, instead of trying to guard the
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| 130 | Channel, the English fleet should make for the coast of Spain, and boldly
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| 131 | assail the Armada as soon as it put to sea. This was the advice of a man who
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| 132 | had all the shining qualities of Nelson, and seems to have been in no
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| 133 | respect his inferior. It was no counsel of desperation. He was confident of
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| 134 | success. Lord Howard of Effingham, the Admiral, was of the same opinion. The
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| 135 | negotiations were odious to him. For Burghley, who clings to them, he has no
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| 136 | more reverence than Hamlet had for Polonius. "Since England was England," he
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| 137 | writes to Walsingham, "there was never such a stratagem and mask to deceive
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| 138 | her as this treaty of peace. I pray God that we do not curse for this a long
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| 139 | grey beard with a white head witless, that will make all the world think us
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| 140 | heartless. You know whom I mean." </p>
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| 141 | <p align="left">With the hopes and fears of these sea-heroes, it is
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| 142 | instructive to compare the forecast of the great soldier who was to conduct
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| 143 | the invasion. Always obedient and devoted to his sovereign, Parma played his
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| 144 | part in the deceptive negotiations with consummate skill. But his own
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| 145 | opinion was that it would be wise to negotiate in good faith and accept the
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| 146 | English terms. Though prepared to undertake the invasion, he took a very
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| 147 | serious view of the risks to be encountered. He tells Philip that the
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| 148 | English preparations are formidable both by land and sea. Even if the
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| 149 | passage should be safely accomplished, disembarkation would be difficult.
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| 150 | His army, reduced by the hardships of the winter from 30,000 men, which he
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| 151 | had estimated as the proper number, to less than 17,000, was dangerously
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| 152 | small for the work expected of it. He would have to fight battle after
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| 153 | battle, and the further he advanced the weaker would his army become both
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| 154 | from losses and from the necessity of protecting his communications. </p>
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| 155 | <p align="left">Parma had carefully informed himself of the preparations in
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| 156 | England. From the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, attention had been paid to
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| 157 | the organisation, training, and equipment of the militia, and especially
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| 158 | since the relations with Spain had become more hostile. On paper it seems to
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| 159 | have amounted to 117,000 men. Mobilisation was a local business. Sir John
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| 160 | Norris drew up the plan of defence. Beacon fires did the work of the
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| 161 | telegraph. Every man knew whither he was to repair when their blaze should
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| 162 | be seen. The districts to be abandoned, the positions to be defended, the
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| 163 | bridges to be broken, were all marked out. Three armies, calculated to
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| 164 | amount in the aggregate to 73,000 men, were ordered to assemble in July.
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| 165 | Whether so many were actually mustered is doubtful. But Parma would
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| 166 | certainly have found himself confronted by forces vastly superior in numbers
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| 167 | to his own, and would have had, as he said, to fight battle after battle.
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| 168 | The bow had not been entirely abandoned, but the greater part of the
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| 169 | archers--two-thirds in some counties--had lately been armed with calivers.
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| 170 | What was wanting in discipline would have been to some extent made up by the
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| 171 | spontaneous cohesion of a force organised under its natural leaders, the
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| 172 | nobles and gentry of each locality, not a few of whom had seen service
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| 173 | abroad. But, after all, the greatest element of strength was the free spirit
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| 174 | of the people. England was, and had long been, a nation of freemen. There
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| 175 | were a few peers, and a great many knights and gentlemen. But there was no
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| 176 | noble caste, as on the Continent, separated by an impassable barrier of
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| 177 | birth and privilege from the mass of the people. All felt themselves
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| 178 | fellow-countrymen bound together by common sentiments, common interests, and
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| 179 | mutual respect. </p>
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| 180 | <p align="left">This spirit of freedom--one might almost say of
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| 181 | equality--made itself felt still more in the navy, and goes far to account
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| 182 | for the cheerful energy and dash with which every service was performed.
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| 183 | "The English officers lived on terms of sympathy with their men unknown to
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| 184 | the Spaniards, who raised between the commander and the commanded absurd
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| 185 | barriers of rank and blood which forbade to his pride any labour but that of
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| 186 | fighting. Drake touched the true mainspring of English success when he once
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| 187 | (in his voyage round the world) indignantly rebuked some coxcomb
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| 188 | gentlemen-adventurers with, 'I should like to see the gentleman that will
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| 189 | refuse to set his hand to a rope. I must have the gentlemen to hale and draw
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| 190 | with the mariners." Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher were all born of humble
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| 191 | parents. They rose by their own valour and capacity. They had gentlemen of
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| 192 | birth serving under them. To Howard and Cumberland and Seymour they were
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| 193 | brothers-in-arms. The master of every little trading vessel was fired by
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| 194 | their example, and hoped to climb as high. </p>
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| 195 | <p align="left">It is the pleasure of some writers to speak of Elizabeth's
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| 196 | naval preparations as disgracefully insufficient, and to treat the
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| 197 | triumphant result as a sort of miracle. To their apprehension, indeed, her
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| 198 | whole reign is one long interference by Providence with the ordinary
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| 199 | relations of cause and effect. The number of royal ships as compared with
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| 200 | those of private owners in the fleet which met the great Armada-34 to
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| 201 | 161--is represented as discreditably small. By Englishmen of that day, it
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| 202 | was considered to be. creditably large. Sir Edward Coke (who was thirtyeight
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| 203 | at the time of the Armada), writing under Charles I., when the royal navy
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| 204 | was much larger, says: "In the reign of Queen Elizabeth (I being then
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| 205 | acquainted with this business) there were thirty-three [royal ships] besides
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| 206 | pinnaces, which so guarded and regarded the navigation of the merchants, as
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| 207 | they had safe vent for their commodities, and trade and traffic flourished."<a onclick="return pageTxt_href_onClick(this,true);" href="beeslychapterten.html#2">
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| 208 | </a></p>
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| 209 | <p align="left">It seems to be overlooked that the royal navy, such as it
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| 210 | was, was almost the creation of Elizabeth. Her father was the first English
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| 211 | king who made any attempt to keep a standing navy of his own. He established
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| 212 | the Admiralty and the first royal dockyard. Under Edward and Mary the navy,
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| 213 | like everything else, went to ruin. Elizabeth's ship-building, humble as it
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| 214 | seems to us, excited the admiration of her subjects, and was regarded as one
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| 215 | of the chief advances of her reign. The ships, when not in commission, were
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| 216 | kept in the Medway. The Queen personally paid the greatest attention to
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| 217 | them. They were always kept in excellent condition, and could be fitted out
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| 218 | for sea at very short notice. Economy was enforced in this, as in other
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| 219 | departments, but not at the expense of efficiency. The wages of officers and
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| 220 | men were very much augmented; but in the short periods for which crews were
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| 221 | enlisted, and in the victualling, there seems to have been unwise parsimony
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| 222 | in 1588. The grumbling of alarmists about unpreparedness, apathy,
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| 223 | stinginess, and red-tape was precisely what it is in our own day. We know
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| 224 | that some allowance is to be made for it. </p>
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| 225 | <p align="left">The movements of the Armada were perfectly well known in
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| 226 | England, and all the dispositions to meet it at sea were completed in a
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| 227 | leisurely manner. Conferences were still going on at Ostend between English
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| 228 | and Spanish commissioners. On the part of Elizabeth there was sincerity, but
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| 229 | not blind credulity nor any disposition to make unworthy concessions.
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| 230 | Conferences quite as protracted have often been held between belligerents
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| 231 | while hostilities were being actively carried on. The large majority of
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| 232 | Englishmen were resolved to fight to the death against any invader. But, as
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| 233 | against Spain, there was not that eager pugnacity which a war with France
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| 234 | always called forth, except, perhaps, among the sea-rovers; and even they
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| 235 | would have contented themselves, if it had been possible, with the
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| 236 | unrecognized privateering which had so long given them the profits of war
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| 237 | with the immunities of peace. The rest of the nation respected their Queen
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| 238 | for her persevering endeavour to find a way of reconciliation with an
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| 239 | ancient ally, and to limit, in the meantime, the area of hostilities. They
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| 240 | were confident, and with good reason, that she would surrender no important
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| 241 | interest, and that aggressive designs would be met, as they had always been
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| 242 | met, more than half-way. </p>
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| 243 | <p align="left">The story of the great victory is too well known to need
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| 244 | repetition here. But some comments are necessary. It is usual, for one
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| 245 | reason or other, to exaggerate the disparity of the opposing fleets, and to
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| 246 | represent England as only saved from impending ruin by the extraordinary
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| 247 | daring of her seamen, and a series of fortunate accidents. The final
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| 248 | destruction of the Armada, after the pursuit was over, was certainly the
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| 249 | work of wind and sea. But if we fairly weigh the available strength on each
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| 250 | side, we shall see that the English commanders might from the first feel, as
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| 251 | they did feel, a reasonable assurance of defeating the invaders. </p>
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| 252 | <p align="left">Let us first compare the strength of the fleets: <i>--I will
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| 253 | insert this graphic as soon as possible--Marilee</i></p>
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| 254 | <p align="left">The Armada carried besides 21,855 soldiers. The first thing
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| 255 | that strikes us is the immense preponderance in tonnage on the part of the
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| 256 | Spaniards, and in sailors on the part of the English. This really goes far
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| 257 | to explain the result. Nothing is more certain than that the Spanish ships,
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| 258 | notwithstanding their superior size, were for fighting and sailing purposes
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| 259 | very inferior to the English. It had always been believed that, to withstand
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| 260 | the heavy seas of the Atlantic, a ship should be constructed like a lofty
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| 261 | fortress. The English builders were introducing lower and longer hulls and a
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| 262 | greater spread of canvas. Their crews, as has always been the case in oar
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| 263 | navy, were equally handy as sailors and gunners. The Spanish ships were
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| 264 | under-manned. The soldiers were not accustomed to work the guns, and were of
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| 265 | no use unless it came to boarding, which Howard ordered his captains to
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| 266 | avoid. The English guns, if fewer than the Spanish, were heavier and worked
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| 267 | by more practised men. Their balls not only cut up the rigging of the
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| 268 | Spaniards but tore their hulls (which were supposed to be cannon-proof),
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| 269 | while the English ships were hardly touched. The slaughter among the
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| 270 | wretched soldiers crowded between decks was terrible. Blood was seen pouring
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| 271 | out of the leescuppers. "The English ships," says a Spanish officer, "were
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| 272 | under such good management that they did with them what they pleased." The
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| 273 | work was done almost entirely by the Queen's ships." If you had seen," says
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| 274 | Sir William Winter, "the simple service done by the merchants and coast
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| 275 | ships, you would have said we had been little helped by them, otherwise than
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| 276 | that they did make a show." </p>
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| 277 | <p align="left">The principal and final battle was fought off Gravelines.
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| 278 | </font>
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| 279 | </font>
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| 280 | <font face="Times New Roman">
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| 281 | The Armada therefore did arrive at its destination, but only to show that
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| 282 | the general plan of the invasion was an impracticable one. The superiority
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| 283 | in tonnage and number of guns on the morning of that day, though not what it
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| 284 | had been when the fighting began a week before, was still immense, if
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| 285 | superiority in those particulars had been of any use. But with this battle
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| 286 | the plan of Philip was finally shattered. So far from being in a condition
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| 287 | to cover Parma's passage, the Spanish admiral was glad to escape as best he
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| 288 | could from the English pursuit. </p>
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| 289 | <p align="left">During the eight days' fight, be it observed, the Armada had
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| 290 | experienced no unfavourable weather or other stroke of ill-fortune. The wind
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| 291 | had been mostly in the west, and not tempestuous. After the last battle,
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| 292 | when the crippled Spanish ships were drifting upon the Dutch shoals, it
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| 293 | opportunely shifted, and enabled them to escape into the North Sea. </p>
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| 294 | <p align="left">It would not be easy to find any great naval engagement in
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| 295 | which the victors suffered so little. In the last battle, when they came to
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| 296 | close quarters, they had about sixty killed. During the first seven days
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| 297 | their loss seems to have been almost nil. One vessel only-not belonging to
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| 298 | the Queen--became entangled among the enemy, and succumbed. Except the
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| 299 | master of this vessel not one of the captains was killed from first to last.
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| 300 | Many men of rank were serving in the fleet. It
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| 301 | </font>
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| 302 | <font style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">
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| 303 | <font face="Times New Roman">
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| 304 | is not mentioned that one of them was so much as wounded. </p>
|
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| 305 | <p align="left">Looking at all these facts, we can surely come to only one
|
|---|
| 306 | conclusion. Philip's plan was hopeless from the first. Barring accidents,
|
|---|
| 307 | the English were bound to win. On no other occasion in our history was our
|
|---|
| 308 | country so well prepared to meet her enemies. Never was her safety from
|
|---|
| 309 | invasion so amply guaranteed. The defeat of the Great Armada was the
|
|---|
| 310 | deserved and crowning triumph of thirty years of good government at home and
|
|---|
| 311 | wise policy abroad; of careful provision for defence and sober abstinence
|
|---|
| 312 | from adventure and aggression. </p>
|
|---|
| 313 | <p align="left">Of the land preparations it is impossible to speak with
|
|---|
| 314 | equal confidence, as they were never put to the test. If the Spaniards had
|
|---|
| 315 | landed, Leicester's militia would no doubt have experienced a bloody defeat.
|
|---|
| 316 | London might have been taken and plundered. But Parma himself never expected
|
|---|
| 317 | to become master of the country without the aid of a great Catholic rising.
|
|---|
| 318 | This, we may affirm with confidence, would not have taken place on even the
|
|---|
| 319 | smallest scale. Overwhelming forces would soon have gathered round the
|
|---|
| 320 | Spaniards. They would probably have retired to the coast, and there
|
|---|
| 321 | fortified some place from which it would have been difficult to dislodge
|
|---|
| 322 | them as long as they retained the command of the sea. </p>
|
|---|
| 323 | <p align="left">Such seems to have been the utmost success which, in the
|
|---|
| 324 | most favourable event, could have attended the invasion. A great disaster,
|
|---|
| 325 | no doubt, for England, and one for which Elizabeth would have been judged by
|
|---|
| 326 | history with more severity than justice; for Englishmen have always chosen
|
|---|
| 327 | to risk it, down to our own time.(1) No government which insisted on making
|
|---|
| 328 | adequate provision for the military defence of the country would have been
|
|---|
| 329 | tolerated then, or, to all appearance, would be tolerated now. We have
|
|---|
| 330 | always trusted to our navy. It were to be wished that our naval superiority
|
|---|
| 331 | were as assured now as when we defeated the Armada. </p>
|
|---|
| 332 | <p align="left">The arrangements for feeding the soldiers and sailors were
|
|---|
| 333 | very defective. A praiseworthy system of control had been introduced to
|
|---|
| 334 | check waste and peculation in time of peace. Of course it did not easily
|
|---|
| 335 | adapt itself to the exigencies of war. Military operations are sure to
|
|---|
| 336 | suffer where a certain, or rather uncertain, amount of waste and peculation
|
|---|
| 337 | is not risked. We have not forgotten the "horrible and heart-rending"
|
|---|
| 338 | sufferings of our army in the Crimea, which, like those of Elizabeth's
|
|---|
| 339 | fleet, had to be relieved by private effort. In the sixteenth century the
|
|---|
| 340 | lot of the soldier and sailor everywhere was want and disease, varied at
|
|---|
| 341 | intervals by plunder and excess. Philip's soldiers and sailors were worse
|
|---|
| 342 | off than Elizabeth's, though he grudged no money for purposes of war. </p>
|
|---|
| 343 | <p align="left">Those who profess to be scandalised by the appointment of
|
|---|
| 344 | Leicester to the command of the army should point out what fitter choice
|
|---|
| 345 | could have been made. He was the only great nobleman with any military
|
|---|
| 346 | experience; and to suppose that any one but a great nobleman could have been
|
|---|
| 347 | appointed to such a command is to show a profound ignorance of the ideas of
|
|---|
| 348 | the time. He had Sir John Norris, a really able soldier, as his marshal of
|
|---|
| 349 | the camp. After all, no one has alleged that he did not do his duty with
|
|---|
| 350 | energy and intelligence. The story that the Queen thought of making him her
|
|---|
| 351 | "Lieutenant in the government of England and Ireland," but was dissuaded
|
|---|
| 352 | from it by Burghley and Hatton, rests on no authority but that of Camden,
|
|---|
| 353 | who is fond of repeating spiteful gossip about Leicester. No sensible person
|
|---|
| 354 | will believe that she meant to create a sort of Grand Vizier. She may have
|
|---|
| 355 | thought of making him what we should call "Commander-in-Chief." There would
|
|---|
| 356 | be much to say for such a concentration of authority while the kingdom was
|
|---|
| 357 | threatened with invasion. The title of "Lieutenant" was a purely military
|
|---|
| 358 | one, and began to be applied under the Tudors to the commanders of the
|
|---|
| 359 | militia in each county. Leicester's title for the time was "Lieutenant and
|
|---|
| 360 | Captain-General of the Queen's armies and companies." But we find him
|
|---|
| 361 | complaining to Walsingham that the patent of Hunsdon, the commander of the
|
|---|
| 362 | Midland army, gave him independent powers. "I shall have wrong if he
|
|---|
| 363 | absolutely command where my patent doth give me power. You may easily
|
|---|
| 364 | conceive what absurd dealings are likely to fall out if you allow two
|
|---|
| 365 | absolute commanders" (28 July). Camden's story is probably a confused echo
|
|---|
| 366 | of this dispute. </p>
|
|---|
| 367 | <p align="left">Writers who are loth to admit that the trust, the gratitude,
|
|---|
| 368 | the enthusiastic loyalty which Elizabeth inspired were the first and most
|
|---|
| 369 | important cause of the great victory, have sought to belittle the grandest
|
|---|
| 370 | moment of her life by pointing out that the famous speech at Tilbury was
|
|---|
| 371 | made after the battle of Gravelines. But the dispersal of the Armada by the
|
|---|
| 372 | storm of August 5th was not yet known in England. Drake, writing on the 8th
|
|---|
| 373 | and 10th, thinks that it is gone to Denmark to refit, and begs the Queen not
|
|---|
| 374 | to diminish any of her forces. The occasion of the speech on the 10th seems
|
|---|
| 375 | to have been the arrival of a post on that day, while the Queen was at
|
|---|
| 376 | dinner in Leicester's tent, with a false alarm that Parma had embarked all
|
|---|
| 377 | his forces, and might be expected in England immediately.</p>
|
|---|
| 378 | <p align="left">But the Lieutenant-General had reached the end of his
|
|---|
| 379 | career. Three weeks after the Tilbury review he died of "a continued fever,"
|
|---|
| 380 | at the age of fifty-six. He kept Elizabeth's regard to the last, because she
|
|---|
| 381 | believed--and during the latter part of his life, not wrongly--in his
|
|---|
| 382 | fidelity and devotion. There is no sign that she at any time valued his
|
|---|
| 383 | judgment or suffered him to sway her policy, except so far as he was the
|
|---|
| 384 | mouthpiece of abler advisers; nor did she ever allow his enmities, violent
|
|---|
| 385 | as they were, to prejudice her against any of her other servants. His
|
|---|
| 386 | fortune was no doubt much above his deserts, and he has paid the usual
|
|---|
| 387 | penalty. There are few personages in history about whom so much malicious
|
|---|
| 388 | nonsense has been written. </p>
|
|---|
| 389 | <p align="left">We cannot help looking on England as placed in a quite new
|
|---|
| 390 | position by the defeat of the Armada--a position of security and
|
|---|
| 391 | independence. In truth, what was changed was not so much the relative
|
|---|
| 392 | strength of England and Spain as the opinion of it held by Englishmen and
|
|---|
| 393 | Spaniards, and indeed by all Europe. The loss to Philip in mere ships, men,
|
|---|
| 394 | and treasure was no doubt considerable. But his inability to conquer England
|
|---|
| 395 | was demonstrated rather than caused by the destruction of the Armada. Philip
|
|---|
| 396 | himself talked loftily about "placing another fleet upon the seas." But his
|
|---|
| 397 | subjects began to see that defence, not conquest, was now their
|
|---|
| 398 | business--and had been for some time if they had only known it: </p>
|
|---|
| 399 | <blockquote>
|
|---|
| 400 | <p align="left"><i>Cervi, luporum preda rapacium,<br>
|
|---|
| 401 | Sectamur ultro quos opimus<br>
|
|---|
| 402 | Fallere et effugere eat triumphus</i>. </p>
|
|---|
| 403 | </blockquote>
|
|---|
| 404 | <p align="left">Elizabeth's attitude to Philip underwent a marked change.
|
|---|
| 405 | Till then she had been unwilling to abandon the hope of a peaceful
|
|---|
| 406 | settlement. She had dealt him not a few stinging blows, but always with a
|
|---|
| 407 | certain restraint and forbearance, because they were meant for the purpose
|
|---|
| 408 | of bringing him to reason. Thirty years of patience on his part had led her
|
|---|
| 409 | to believe that he would never carry retaliation beyond assassination plots.
|
|---|
| 410 | At last, in his slow way, he had gathered up all his strength and essayed to
|
|---|
| 411 | crush her. Thenceforward she was a convert to Drake's doctrine that attack
|
|---|
| 412 | was the surest way of defence. She had still good reasons for devolving this
|
|---|
| 413 | work as much as possible on the private enterprise of her subjects. The
|
|---|
| 414 | burden fell on those who asked nothing better than to be allowed to bear it.
|
|---|
| 415 | Thus arose that system, or rather practice, of leaving national work to be
|
|---|
| 416 | executed by private enterprise, which has had so much to do with the
|
|---|
| 417 | building up of the British Empire. Private gain has been the mainspring of
|
|---|
| 418 | action. National defence and aggrandisement have been almost incidental
|
|---|
| 419 | results. With Elizabeth herself national and private aims could not be
|
|---|
| 420 | dissevered. The nation and she had but one purse. She was cheaply defending
|
|---|
| 421 | England, and she shared in the plunder. </p>
|
|---|
| 422 | <p align="left">The favourite cruising-ground of the English adventurers was
|
|---|
| 423 | off the Azores, where the Spanish treasure fleets always halted for fresh
|
|---|
| 424 | water and provisions, on their way to Europe. Some of these expeditions were
|
|---|
| 425 | on a large scale. But they were not so successful or profitable, in
|
|---|
| 426 | proportion to their size, as the smaller ventures of Drake and Hawkins
|
|---|
| 427 | earlier in the reign. The Spaniards were everywhere on the alert. The
|
|---|
| 428 | harbours of the New World, which formerly lay in careless security, were put
|
|---|
| 429 | into a state of defence. Treasure fleets made their voyages with more
|
|---|
| 430 | caution. "Not a grain of gold, silver, or pearl, but what must be got
|
|---|
| 431 | through the fire." The day of great prizes was gone by. </p>
|
|---|
| 432 | <p align="left">Two of these expeditions are distinguished by their
|
|---|
| 433 | importance. The first was a joint-stock venture of Drake and Norris--the
|
|---|
| 434 | foremost sailor and the foremost soldier among Englishmen of that day--in
|
|---|
| 435 | the year after the great Armada (April 1589). They and some private backers
|
|---|
| 436 | found most of the capital. The Queen contributed six royal ships and
|
|---|
| 437 | £20,000. This fleet carried no less than 11,000 soldiers, for the aim was to
|
|---|
| 438 | wrest Portugal from the Spaniard and set up Don Antonio, a representative of
|
|---|
| 439 | the dethroned dynasty. </p>
|
|---|
| 440 | <p align="left">Stopping on their way at Corunna, they took the lower town,
|
|---|
| 441 | destroyed large stores, and defeated in the field a much superior force
|
|---|
| 442 | marching to the relief of the place. Norris mined and breached the walls of
|
|---|
| 443 | the upper town; but the storming parties having been repulsed with great
|
|---|
| 444 | loss, the army re-embarked and pursued its voyage. Landing at Peniché,
|
|---|
| 445 | Norris marched fifty miles by Vimiero and Torres Vedras, names famous
|
|---|
| 446 | afterwards in the military annals of England, and on the seventh day arrived
|
|---|
| 447 | before Lisbon. But he had no battering train; for Drake, who had brought the
|
|---|
| 448 | fleet round to the mouth of the Tagus, judged it dangerous to enter the
|
|---|
| 449 | river. Nor did the Portuguese rise, as had been hoped. The army therefore,
|
|---|
| 450 | marching through the suburbs of Lisbon, rejoined the fleet at Cascaes, and
|
|---|
| 451 | proceeded to Vigo. That town was burnt, and the surrounding country
|
|---|
| 452 | plundered. This was the last exploit of the expedition. Great loss and
|
|---|
| 453 | dishonour had been inflicted on Spain; but no less than half of the soldiers
|
|---|
| 454 | and sailors had perished by disease; and the booty, though said to have been
|
|---|
| 455 | large, was a disappointment to the survivors. </p>
|
|---|
| 456 | <p align="left">The other great expedition was in 1596. The capture of
|
|---|
| 457 | Calais in April of that year by the Spaniards, had renewed the alarm of
|
|---|
| 458 | invasion, and it was determined to meet the danger at a distance from home.
|
|---|
| 459 | A great fleet, with 6000 soldiers on board, commanded by Essex and Howard of
|
|---|
| 460 | Effingham sailed straight to Cadiz, the principal port and arsenal of Spain.
|
|---|
| 461 | The harbour was forced by the fleet, the town and castle stormed by the
|
|---|
| 462 | army, several men-of-war taken or destroyed, a large merchant-fleet burnt,
|
|---|
| 463 | together with an immense quantity of stores and merchandise; the total value
|
|---|
| 464 | being estimated at twenty millions of ducats. This was by far the heaviest
|
|---|
| 465 | blow inflicted by England upon Spain during the reign, and was so regarded
|
|---|
| 466 | in Europe; for though the great Armada had been signally defeated by the
|
|---|
| 467 | English fleet, its subsequent destruction was due to the winds and waves.
|
|---|
| 468 | Essex was vehemently desirous to hold Cadiz; but Effingham and the Council
|
|---|
| 469 | of War appointed by the Queen would not hear of it. The expedition
|
|---|
| 470 | accordingly returned home, having effectually relieved England from the fear
|
|---|
| 471 | of invasion. The burning of Penzance by four Spanish galleys (1595) was not
|
|---|
| 472 | much to set against these great successes. </p>
|
|---|
| 473 | <p align="left">One reason for the comparative impunity with which the
|
|---|
| 474 | English assailed the unwieldy empire of Philip was the insane pursuit of the
|
|---|
| 475 | French crown, to which he devoted all his resources after the murder of
|
|---|
| 476 | Henry III. In 1598, with one foot in the grave, and no longer able to
|
|---|
| 477 | conceal from himself that, with the exception of the conquest of Portugal,
|
|---|
| 478 | all the ambitious schemes of his life had failed, he was fain to conclude
|
|---|
| 479 | the peace of Vervins with Henry IV. Henry was ready to insist that England
|
|---|
| 480 | and the United Provinces should be comprehended in the treaty. Philip
|
|---|
| 481 | offered terms which Elizabeth would have welcomed ten years earlier. He
|
|---|
| 482 | proposed that the whole of the Low Countries should be constituted a
|
|---|
| 483 | separate sovereignty under his son-in-law the Archduke Albert. The Dutch,
|
|---|
| 484 | who were prospering in war as well as in trade, scouted the offer. English
|
|---|
| 485 | feeling was divided. There was a war-party headed by Essex and Raleigh,
|
|---|
| 486 | personally bitter enemies, but both athirst for glory, conquest, and empire,
|
|---|
| 487 | believing in no right but that of the strongest, greedy for wealth, and
|
|---|
| 488 | disdaining the slower, more laborious, and more legitimate modes of
|
|---|
| 489 | acquiring it. They were tired of campaigning it in France and the Low
|
|---|
| 490 | Countries, where hard knocks and beggarly plunder were all that a soldier
|
|---|
| 491 | had to look to. They proposed to carry a great English army across the
|
|---|
| 492 | Atlantic, to occupy permanently the isthmus of Panama, and from that central
|
|---|
| 493 | position to wrestle with the Spaniard for the trade and plunder of the New
|
|---|
| 494 | World. The peace party held that these ambitious schemes would bring no
|
|---|
| 495 | profit except possibly to a few individuals; that the treasury would be
|
|---|
| 496 | exhausted and the country irritated by taxation and the pressing of
|
|---|
| 497 | soldiers; that to re-establish the old commercial intercourse with Spain
|
|---|
| 498 | would be more reputable and attended with more solid advantage to the nation
|
|---|
| 499 | at large; and finally, that the English arms would be much better employed
|
|---|
| 500 | in a thorough conquest of Ireland. These were the views of Burghley; and
|
|---|
| 501 | they were strongly supported by Buckhurst, the best of the younger statesmen
|
|---|
| 502 | who now surrounded Elizabeth. </p>
|
|---|
| 503 | <p align="left">Elizabeth always encouraged her ministers to speak their
|
|---|
| 504 | minds; but, as Buckhurst said on this occasion, "when they have done their
|
|---|
| 505 | extreme duty she wills what she wills." She determined to maintain the
|
|---|
| 506 | treaty of 1585 with the Dutch. but she took the opportunity of getting it
|
|---|
| 507 | amended in such a way as to throw upon them a larger share of the expenses
|
|---|
| 508 | of the war, and to provide more definitely for the ultimate repayment of her
|
|---|
| 509 | advances. </p>
|
|---|
| 510 | <p align="left">We have seen that three years before the Armada Elizabeth
|
|---|
| 511 | had lost the French alliance, which had till then been the key-stone of her
|
|---|
| 512 | policy. Since then, though aware that Henry III. wished her well, and that
|
|---|
| 513 | he would thwart the Spanish faction as much as he dared, she had not been
|
|---|
| 514 | able to count on him. He might at any moment be pushed by Guise into an
|
|---|
| 515 | attack on England, either with or without the concurrence of Spain. The
|
|---|
| 516 | accession, therefore, of Henry IV. afforded her great relief. In him she had
|
|---|
| 517 | a sure ally. It is true that, like her other allies the Dutch, he was more
|
|---|
| 518 | in a condition to require help than to afford it. But the more work she
|
|---|
| 519 | provided for Philip in Holland or France, the safer England would be. The
|
|---|
| 520 | armies of the Holy League might be formidable to Henry; but as long as he
|
|---|
| 521 | could hold them at bay they were not dangerous to England. She had never
|
|---|
| 522 | quite got over her scruple about helping the Dutch against their lawful
|
|---|
| 523 | sovereign. But Henry IV. was the legitimate King of France, and she could
|
|---|
| 524 | heartily aid him to put down his rebels. From 2000 to 5000 English troops
|
|---|
| 525 | were therefore constantly serving in France down to the peace of Vervins.
|
|---|
| 526 | </p>
|
|---|
| 527 | <p align="left">Philip, in defiance of the Salic law, claimed the crown of
|
|---|
| 528 | France for his daughter in right of her mother, who was a sister of Henry
|
|---|
| 529 | III. To Brittany he alleged that she had a special claim, as being descended
|
|---|
| 530 | from Anne of Brittany, which the Bourbons were not. Brittany, therefore, he
|
|---|
| 531 | invaded at once by sea. Elizabeth, alarmed by the proximity of this Spanish
|
|---|
| 532 | force, desired that her troops in France should be employed in expelling it,
|
|---|
| 533 | and that they should be vigorously supported by Henry IV. Henry, on the
|
|---|
| 534 | other hand, was always drawing away the English to serve his more pressing
|
|---|
| 535 | needs in other parts of France. This brought upon him many harsh rebukes and
|
|---|
| 536 | threats from the English Queen. But she had, for the first time, met her
|
|---|
| 537 | match. He judged, and rightly, that she would not desert him. So, with
|
|---|
| 538 | oft-repeated apologies, light promises, and well-turned compliments, he just
|
|---|
| 539 | went on doing what suited him best, getting all the fighting he could out of
|
|---|
| 540 | the English, and airily eluding Elizabeth's repeated demands for some coast
|
|---|
| 541 | town, which could be held, like Brill and Flushing, as a security for her
|
|---|
| 542 | heavy subsidies. </p>
|
|---|
| 543 | <p align="left">When Henry was reconciled to the Catholic Church, Elizabeth
|
|---|
| 544 | went through the form of expressing surprise and regret at a step which she
|
|---|
| 545 | must have long expected, and must have felt to be wise (1593). Her alliance
|
|---|
| 546 | with Henry was not shaken. It was drawn even closer by a new treaty, each
|
|---|
| 547 | sovereign engaging not to make peace without the consent of the other. This
|
|---|
| 548 | engagement did not prevent Henry from concluding the separate peace of
|
|---|
| 549 | Vervins five years later, when he judged that his interest required it
|
|---|
| 550 | (1598). Elizabeth's dissatisfaction was, this time, genuine enough. But
|
|---|
| 551 | Henry was no longer her protégé, a homeless, landless, penniless king,
|
|---|
| 552 | depending on English subsidies, roaming over the realm he called his own
|
|---|
| 553 | with a few thousands, or sometimes hundreds, of undisciplined cavaliers, who
|
|---|
| 554 | gathered and dispersed at their own pleasure. He was master of a re-united
|
|---|
| 555 | France, and could no longer be either patronised or threatened. Elizabeth
|
|---|
| 556 | might expostulate, and declare that "if there was such a sin as that against
|
|---|
| 557 | the Holy Ghost it must needs be ingratitude:" gratitude was a sentiment to
|
|---|
| 558 | which she was as much a stranger as Henry. The only difference between them
|
|---|
| 559 | was the national one: the Englishwoman preached; the Frenchman mocked. What
|
|---|
| 560 | made her so sore was that he had, so to speak, stolen her policy from her.
|
|---|
| 561 | His predecessor had always suspected her--and with good reason--of intending
|
|---|
| 562 | "to draw her neck out of the collar" if once she could induce him to
|
|---|
| 563 | undertake a joint war. The joint war had at length been undertaken by Henry
|
|---|
| 564 | IV., and it was he who had managed to slip out of it first, while Elizabeth,
|
|---|
| 565 | who longed for peace, was obliged to stand by the Dutch. </p>
|
|---|
| 566 | <p align="left">The two sovereigns, however, knew their own interests too
|
|---|
| 567 | well to quarrel. Henry gave Elizabeth to understand that his designs against
|
|---|
| 568 | Spain had undergone no change; he was only halting for breath; he would help
|
|---|
| 569 | the Dutch underhand--just what she used to say to Henry III. She had now to
|
|---|
| 570 | deal with a French King as sagacious as herself, and a great deal more
|
|---|
| 571 | prompt and vigorous in action; not the man to be made a cat's-paw by any
|
|---|
| 572 | one. She had to accept him as a partner, if not on her own terms, then on
|
|---|
| 573 | his. Both sovereigns were thoroughly veracious--in Carlyle's sense of the
|
|---|
| 574 | word. That is to say, their policy was determined not by passion, or vanity,
|
|---|
| 575 | or sentiment of any kind, but by enlightened self-interest, and was
|
|---|
| 576 | therefore calculable by those who knew how to calculate. </p>
|
|---|
| 577 | </font>
|
|---|
| 578 | <hr>
|
|---|
| 579 | <font face="Times New Roman">
|
|---|
| 580 | <p align="left"><b>Notes: </b>1.
|
|---|
| 581 | </font>
|
|---|
| 582 | <font style="font-family: Times New Roman">The Earl of Sussex, after
|
|---|
| 583 | inspecting the preparations for defence in Hampshire towards the end of
|
|---|
| 584 | 1587, writes to the Council that he had found nothing ready. The "better
|
|---|
| 585 | sort" said, "We are much charged many ways, and when the enemy comes we will
|
|---|
| 586 | provide for him; but he will not come yet." </p>
|
|---|
| 587 | </font>
|
|---|
| 588 | <p align="left"><font style="font-family: Times New Roman" size="2">From <i>
|
|---|
| 589 | Queen Elizabeth</i> by Edward Spencer Beesly. Published in London by
|
|---|
| 590 | Macmillan and Co., 1892.</font></p>
|
|---|
| 591 | </font>
|
|---|
| 592 | <font face="Times New Roman" size="2">
|
|---|
| 593 | </blockquote>
|
|---|
| 594 | </blockquote>
|
|---|
| 595 |
|
|---|
| 596 | <p align="center">
|
|---|
| 597 | <a href="beeslychaptereleven.html">to Chapter
|
|---|
| 598 | XI: Domestic Affairs: 1588-1601</a></p>
|
|---|
| 599 | <p align="center">
|
|---|
| 600 | <a href="monarchs/eliz1.html">to the Queen
|
|---|
| 601 | Elizabeth I website</a> /
|
|---|
| 602 | <a href="relative/maryqos.html">to the Mary,
|
|---|
| 603 | queen of Scots website</a></p>
|
|---|
| 604 | <p align="center"><a href="secondary.html">
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