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| 11 | <title>Secondary Sources: Queen Elizabeth by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892:
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| 12 | Chapter VIII</title>
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| 34 | <td width="25%" height="610"></td>
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| 36 | <p align="center"><b><font size="7">Queen Elizabeth<br></font></b>
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| 37 | <font size="4">by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</font></p>
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| 38 | <p align="center">
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| 39 | <img border="2" src="eliz1-ermine.jpg" width="400" height="478" alt="'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas Hilliard"><p align="center">
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| 40 | <i><font size="2">'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas
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| 41 | Hilliard;<br>from the <a href="http://www.marileecody.com/eliz1-images.html">Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I</a> website</font></i></td>
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| 42 | <td width="25%" height="610"></td>
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| 44 | </table>
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| 45 | <blockquote>
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| 46 | <blockquote>
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| 53 | <div align="left">
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| 54 | <b>CHAPTER VIII</b><br>
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| 55 | <b>THE PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS: 1584-86</b></div>
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| 56 | <p align="left">WE are now approaching the great crisis of the reign, some
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| 57 | may think of English history--the grand struggle with Spain; a struggle
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| 58 | which, if Elizabeth had allowed herself to be guided by her most celebrated
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| 59 | counsellors, would have been entered upon a quarter of a century earlier.
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| 60 | England was then unarmed and weighed down with a load of debt, the legacy of
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| 61 | three thriftless and pugnacious reigns. The population was still mainly
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| 62 | Catholic. The great nobles still thought themselves a match for the crown,
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| 63 | and many of them longed to make one more effort to assert their old position
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| 64 | in the State. Trade and industry were languishing. The poorer classes were
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| 65 | suffering and discontented. Scotland was in the hands of a most dangerous
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| 66 | enemy, whose title to the English crown was held by many to be better than
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| 67 | Elizabeth's. Philip II., as yet unharassed by revolt, seemed almost to have
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| 68 | drawn England as a sort of satellite into the vast orbit of his empire. </p>
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| 69 | <p align="left">Nearly a generation had now passed away since Elizabeth
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| 70 | ascended the throne. Every year of it had seen some amendment in the
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| 71 | condition of the country. Under a pacific and thrifty Government taxation
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| 72 | had been light beyond precedent. All debts, even those of Henry VIII., had
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| 73 | been honourably paid off. While the lord of American gold mines and of the
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| 74 | richest commercial centres in Europe could not raise a loan on any terms,
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| 75 | Elizabeth could borrow when she pleased at five per cent. But she had ceased
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| 76 | to borrow, for she had a modest surplus stored in her treasury, a department
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| 77 | of the administration managed under her own close personal supervision. A
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| 78 | numerous militia had been enrolled and partially trained. Large magazines of
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| 79 | arms had been accumulated. A navy had been created; not a large one indeed;
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| 80 | but it did not need to be large, for the warship of those days did not
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| 81 | differ from the ordinary vessel of commerce, nor was its crew differently
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| 82 | trained. The royal navy could therefore be indefinitely increased if need
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| 83 | arose. Philip's great generals, Alva and Parma, had long come to the
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| 84 | conclusion that the conquest of England would be the most difficult
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| 85 | enterprise their master could undertake. The wealth of landed proprietors
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| 86 | and traders had increased enormously. New manufactures had been started by
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| 87 | exiles from the Netherlands. New branches of foreign commerce had been
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| 88 | opened up. The poor were well employed and contented. I believe it would be
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| 89 | impossible to find in the previous history of England, or, for that matter,
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| 90 | of Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, any instance of peace,
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| 91 | prosperity, and good government extending over so many years. </p>
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| 92 | <p align="left">Looking abroad we find that in all directions the strength
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| 93 | and security of Elizabeth's position had been immensely increased. Her
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| 94 | ministers, especially Walsingham--for Burghley in his old age came at last
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| 95 | to see more with the eyes of his mistress--believed that by a more spirited
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| 96 | policy Scotland might have been converted into a submissive and valuable
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| 97 | ally. Elizabeth alone saw that this was impossible; that, so treated,
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| 98 | Scotland would become to England what Holland was to Philip, what "the
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| 99 | Spanish ulcer" was afterwards to Napoleon--a fatal drain on her strength and
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| 100 | resources. It was enough for Elizabeth if the northern kingdom was so
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| 101 | handled as to be harmless; and this, as I have shown, was in fact its
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| 102 | condition from the moment that the only Scottish ruler who could be really
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| 103 | dangerous was locked up in England. </p>
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| 104 | <p align="left">The Dutch revolt crippled Philip. The conquest of England
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| 105 | was postponed till the Dutch revolt should be suppressed. Why then, it has
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| 106 | been asked, did not Elizabeth support the Dutch more vigorously? The answer
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| 107 | is a simple one. If she had done so the suppression of the Dutch revolt
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| 108 | would have been postponed to the conquest of England. This is proved by the
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| 109 | events now to be related. Elizabeth was obliged by new circumstances to
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| 110 | intervene more vigorously in the Netherlands, and the result was the Armada.
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| 111 | If the attack had come ten or fifteen years earlier the fortune of England
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| 112 | might have been different. </p>
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| 113 | <p align="left">Elizabeth's foreign policy has been judged unfavourably by
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| 114 | writers who have failed to keep in view how completely it turned on her
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| 115 | relations with France. Though her interests and those of Henry III cannot be
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| 116 | called identical, they coincided sufficiently to make it possible to keep up
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| 117 | a good understanding which was of the highest advantage to both countries.
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| 118 | But to maintain this good understanding there was need of the coolest temper
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| 119 | and judgment on the part of the rulers; for the two peoples were hopelessly
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| 120 | hostile. They were like two gamecocks in adjoining pens. The Spaniards were
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| 121 | respected and liked by our countrymen. Their grave dignity, even their stiff
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| 122 | assumption of intrinsic superiority, were too like our own not to awake a
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| 123 | certain appreciative sympathy. Whereas all Englishmen from peer to peasant
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| 124 | would at any time have enjoyed a tussle with France, until its burdens began
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| 125 | to be felt. </p>
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| 126 | <p align="left">Henry III, with whom the Valois dynasty was about to expire,
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| 127 | was far from being the incompetent driveller depicted by most historians. He
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| 128 | had good abilities, plenty of natural courage when roused, and a thorough
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| 129 | comprehension of the politics of his day. His aims and plans were well
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| 130 | conceived. But with no child to care for, and immersed in degrading
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| 131 | self-indulgence, he wearied of the exertions and sacrifices necessary for
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| 132 | carrying them through. Short spells of sensible and energetic action were
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| 133 | succeeded by periods of unworthy lassitude and pusillanimous surrender.
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| 134 | Before he came to the throne he had been the chief organiser of the
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| 135 | Bartholomew Massacre. As King he naturally inclined, like Elizabeth, William
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| 136 | of Orange, and Henry of Navarre, to make considerations of religion
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| 137 | subordinate to considerations of State. Both he and Navarre would have been
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| 138 | glad to throw over the fanatical or factious partisans by whom they were
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| 139 | surrounded, and rally the <i>Politiques</i> to their support. But it was a
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| 140 | step that neither as yet ventured openly to take. The one was obliged to
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| 141 | affect zeal for the old religion, the other for the new. </p>
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| 142 | <p align="left">Elizabeth's ministers, with short-sighted animosity, had
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| 143 | been urging her throughout her reign to give vigorous support to the
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| 144 | Huguenots. She herself took a broader view of the situation. She preferred
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| 145 | to deal with the legitimate government of France recognised by the vast
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| 146 | majority of Frenchmen. Henry III., as she well knew, did not intend or
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| 147 | desire to exterminate the Huguenots. If that turbulent faction had been
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| 148 | openly abetted in its arrogant claims by English assistance, he would have
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| 149 | been obliged to become the mere instrument of Elizabeth's worst enemies,
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| 150 | Guise and the Holy League. France would have ceased to be any counterpoise
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| 151 | to Spain. The English Queen had so skilfully played a most difficult and
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| 152 | delicate game that Henry of Navarre had been able to keep his head above
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| 153 | water; Guise had upon the whole been held in check; the royal authority,
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| 154 | though impaired, had still controlled the foreign policy of France, and so,
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| 155 | since 1572, had given England a firm and useful ally. As long as this
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| 156 | balanced situation could be maintained, England was safe. </p>
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| 157 | <p align="left">But the time was now at hand when this nice equilibrium of
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| 158 | forces would be disturbed by events which neither Elizabeth nor any one else
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| 159 | could help. Alençon, the last of the Valois line, was dying. When he should
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| 160 | be gone, the next heir to the French King would be no other than the
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| 161 | Huguenot Henry of Bourbon, King of the tiny morsel of Navarre that lay north
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| 162 | of the Pyrenees. Henry III. wished to recognise his right. But it was
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| 163 | impossible that Guise or Philip, or the French nation itself, should
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| 164 | tolerate this prospect. Thus the great war of religion which Elizabeth had
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| 165 | so carefully abstained from stirring up was now inevitable. The French
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| 166 | alliance, the key-stone of her policy, was about to crumble away with the
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| 167 | authority of the French King which she had buttressed up. He would be
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| 168 | compelled either to become the mere instrument of the Papal party or to
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| 169 | combine openly with the Huguenot leader. In either case, Guise, not Henry
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| 170 | III., would be the virtual sovereign, and Elizabeth's alliance would not be
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| 171 | with France but with a French faction. She would thus be forced into the
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| 172 | position which she had hitherto refused to accept--that of sole protector of
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| 173 | French and Dutch Protestants, and open antagonist of Spain. The more showy
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| 174 | part she was now to play has been the chief foundation of her glory with
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| 175 | posterity. It is a glory which she deserves. The most industrious
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| 176 | disparagement will never rob her of it. But the sober student will be of
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| 177 | opinion that her reputation as a statesman has a more solid basis in the
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| 178 | skill and firmness with which during so many years she staved off the
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| 179 | necessity for decisive action. </p>
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| 180 | <p align="left">Although the discovery of the Throgmorton plot (November
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| 181 | 1583), and the consequent expulsion of the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were
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| 182 | not immediately followed by open war between England and Spain, yet the
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| 183 | course of events thenceforward tended directly to that issue. Elizabeth
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| 184 | immediately proposed to the Dutch States to form a naval alliance against
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| 185 | Spain, and to concert other measures for mutual defence. </p>
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| 186 | <p align="left">Orange met the offer with alacrity, and pressed Elizabeth to
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| 187 | accept the sovereignty of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Perhaps there was
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| 188 | no former ruler of England who would not have clutched at such an
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| 189 | opportunity of territorial aggrandisement. For Elizabeth it had no charms.
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| 190 | Every sensible person now will applaud the sobriety of her aims. But though
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| 191 | she eschewed territory, she desired to have military occupation of one or
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| 192 | more coast fortresses, at all events for a time, both as a security for the
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| 193 | fidelity of the Dutch to any engagements they might make with her, and to
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| 194 | enable her to treat on more equal terms with France or Spain, if the
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| 195 | Netherlands were destined, after all, to fall into the hands of one of those
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| 196 | powers. </p>
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| 197 | <p align="left">While these negotiations were in progress, William of Orange
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| 198 | was murdered (1584). Alençon had died a month earlier. The sovereignty of
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| 199 | the revolted Netherlands was thus vacant. Elizabeth advised a joint
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| 200 | protectorate by France and England. But the Dutch had small confidence in
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| 201 | protectorates, especially of the joint kind. What they wanted was a
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| 202 | sovereign, and as Elizabeth would not accept them as her subjects they
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| 203 | offered themselves to Henry III. But after nibbling at the offer for eight
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| 204 | months Henry was obliged to refuse it. His openly expressed intention to
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| 205 | recognise the King of Navarre as his heir had caused a revival of the Holy
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| 206 | League. During the winter 1584-5 its reorganisation was busily going on.
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| 207 | Philip promised to subsidise it. Mendoza, now ambassador at Paris, was its
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| 208 | life and soul. The insurrection was on the point of breaking out. Henry III
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| 209 | knew that the vast majority of Frenchmen were Catholics. To accept the Dutch
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| 210 | offer would, he feared, drive them all into the ranks of the Holy League. He
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| 211 | therefore dismissed the Dutch envoys with the recommendation that they
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| 212 | should apply to England for protection (1585). The manifesto of the Leaguers
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| 213 | appeared at the end of March (1585). Henry of Navarre was declared
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| 214 | incapable, as a Protestant, of succeeding to the crown. Henry III. was
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| 215 | summoned to extirpate heresy. To enforce these demands the Leaguers flew to
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| 216 | arms all over France. Had Henry III. been a man of spirit he would have
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| 217 | placed himself at the head of the loyal Catholics and fought it out. But by
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| 218 | the compact of Nemours he conceded all the demands of the League (1585). </p>
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| 219 | </font>
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| 220 | </font>
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| 221 | <font face="Times New Roman">
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| 222 | <p>Thus began the last great war of religion, which lasted till Henry of
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| 223 | Navarre was firmly seated on the throne of France. </p>
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| 224 | <p align="left">Elizabeth had now finally lost the French alliance, the
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| 225 | sheet-anchor of her policy since 1572, and she prepared for the grand
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| 226 | struggle which could no longer be averted. As France failed her, she must
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| 227 | make the best of the Dutch alliance. She did not conceal from herself that
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| 228 | she would have to do her share of the fighting. But she was determined that
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| 229 | the Dutch should also do theirs. Deprived of all hope of help from France
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| 230 | they wished for annexation to the English crown, because solidarity between
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| 231 | the two countries would give them an unlimited claim upon English resources.
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| 232 | Elizabeth uniformly told them, first and last, that nothing should induce
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| 233 | her to accept that proposal. She would give them a definite amount of
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| 234 | </font>
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| 235 | <font style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">
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| 236 | <font face="Times New Roman">
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| 237 | assistance in men and money. But every farthing would have to be repaid when
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| 238 | the war was over; and in the meantime she must have Flushing and Brill as
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| 239 | security. They must also bind themselves to make proper exertions in their
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| 240 | own defence. Gilpin, her agent in Zealand, had warned her that if she showed
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| 241 | herself too forward they would simply throw the whole burden of the war upon
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| 242 | her. Splendid as had often been the resistance of separate towns when
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| 243 | besieged, there had been, from the first, lamentable selfishness and apathy
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| 244 | as to measures for combined defence. The States had less than 6000 men in
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| 245 | the field--half of them English volunteers--at the very time when they were
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| 246 | assuring Elizabeth that, if she would come to their assistance, they could
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| 247 | and would furnish 15,000. She was justified in regarding their fine promises
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| 248 | with much distrust. </p>
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| 249 | <p align="left">While this discussion was going on, Antwerp was lost. The
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| 250 | blame of the delay, if blame there was, must be divided equally between the
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| 251 | bargainers. The truth is that, cavil as they might about details, the
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| 252 | strength of the English contingent was not the real object of concern to
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| 253 | either of them. Each was thinking of something else. Though Elizabeth had so
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| 254 | peremptorily refused the sovereignty offered by the United Provinces, they
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| 255 | were still bent on forcing it upon her. She, on the other hand, had not
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| 256 | given up the hope that her more decisive intervention would drive Philip to
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| 257 | make the concessions to his revolted subjects which she had so often urged
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| 258 | upon him. In her eyes, Philip's sovereignty over them was indefeasible. They
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| 259 | were, perhaps, justified in asserting their ancient constitutional rights
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| 260 | But if those were guaranteed, continuance of the rebellion would be
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| 261 | criminal. Moreover, she held that elected deputies were but amateur
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| 262 | statesmen, and had better leave the <i>haute politique</i> to princes to
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| 263 | settle. "Princes," she once told a Dutch deputation, "are not to be charged
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| 264 | with breach of faith if they sometimes listen to both sides; for they
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| 265 | transact business in a princely way and with a princely understanding such
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| 266 | as private persons cannot have." Her promise not to make peace behind their
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| 267 | backs was not to be interpreted as literally as if it had been made to a
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| 268 | brother prince. It merely bound her--so she contended--not to make peace
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| 269 | without safeguarding their interests; that is to say, what she considered to
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| 270 | be their true interests. Conduct based on such a theory would not be
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| 271 | tolerated now, and was not tamely acquiesced in by the Dutch then. But to
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| 272 | speak of it as base and treacherous is an abuse of terms. </p>
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| 273 | <p align="left">It would be impossible to follow in detail the peace
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| 274 | negotiations which went on between Elizabeth and Parma up to the very
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| 275 | sailing of the Armada (1586-8). The terms on which the Queen was prepared to
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| 276 | make peace never varied substantially from first to last. We know very well
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| 277 | what they were. She claimed for the Protestants of the Netherlands (who were
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| 278 | a minority, perhaps, even in the rebel provinces) precisely the same degree
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| 279 | of toleration which she allowed to her own Catholics. They were not to be
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| 280 | questioned about their religion; but there was to be no public worship or
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| 281 | proselytising. The old constitution, as before Alva, was to be restored,
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| 282 | which would have involved the departure of the foreign troops. These terms
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| 283 | would not have satisfied the States, and if Philip could have been induced
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| 284 | to grant them, the States and Elizabeth must have parted company. But, as he
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| 285 | would make no concessions, the Anglo-Dutch alliance could, and did,
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| 286 | continue. The cautionary towns she was determined never to give up to any
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| 287 | one unless (first) she was repaid her expenses for which they had been
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| 288 | mortgaged, and (secondly) the struggle in the Netherlands was brought to an
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| 289 | end on terms which she approved. There was, therefore, never any danger of
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| 290 | their being surrendered to Philip, and they did, in fact, remain in
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| 291 | Elizabeth's hands till her death. </p>
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| 292 | <p align="left">Elizabeth has been severely censured for selecting Leicester
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| 293 | to command the English army in the Netherlands. It is certain that he was
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| 294 | marked out by public opinion as the fittest person. The Queen's choice was
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| 295 | heartily approved by all her ministers, especially by Walsingham, who kept
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| 296 | up the most confidential relations with Leicester, and backed him
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| 297 | throughout. Custom prescribed that an English army should be commanded, not
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| 298 | by a professional soldier, but by a great nobleman. Among the nobility there
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| 299 | were a few who had done a little soldiering in a rough way in Scotland or
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| 300 | Ireland, but no one who could be called a professional general. The
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| 301 | momentous step which Elizabeth was taking would have lost half its
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| 302 | significance in the eyes of Europe if any less conspicuous person than
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| 303 | Leicester had been appointed. Moreover, it was essential that the nobleman
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| 304 | selected should be able and willing to spend largely out of his own
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| 305 | resources. By traditional usage, derived from feudal times, peers who were
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| 306 | employed on temporary services not only received no salary, but were
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| 307 | expected to defray their own expenses, and defray them handsomely. Never did
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| 308 | an English nobleman show more public spirit in this respect than Leicester.
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| 309 | He raised every penny he could by mortgaging his estates. He not only paid
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| 310 | his own personal expenses, but advanced large sums for military purposes,
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| 311 | which his mistress never thought of repaying him. If he effected little as a
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| 312 | general, it was because he was not provided with the means. Serious mistakes
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| 313 | he certainly made, but they were not of a military kind. </p>
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| 314 | <p align="left">Leicester was now fifty-four, bald, white-bearded, and
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| 315 | red-faced, but still imposing in figure, carriage, and dress. To Elizabeth
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| 316 | he was dear as the friend of her youth, one who, she was persuaded, had
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| 317 | loved her for herself when they were both thirty years younger, and was
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| 318 | still her most devoted and trustworthy servant. Burghley she liked and
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| 319 | trusted, and all the more since he had become a more docile instrument of
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| 320 | her policy. Walsingham, a keener intellect and more independent character,
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| 321 | she could not but value, though impatient under his penetrating suspicion
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| 322 | and almost constant disapproval. Leicester was the intimate friend, the
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| 323 | frequent companion of her leisure hours. None of her younger favourites had
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| 324 | supplanted him in her regard. By long intimacy he knew the <i>molles aditus
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| 325 | et tempora</i> when things might be said without offence which were not
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| 326 | acceptable at the council-board. The other ministers were glad to use him
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| 327 | for this purpose. There can be no question that his appointment to the
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| 328 | command in the Netherlands was meant as the most decisive indication that
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| 329 | could be given of Elizabeth's determination to face open war with Philip
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| 330 | rather than allow him to establish absolute government in that country. </p>
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| 331 | <p align="left">Since the deaths of Alençon and William of Orange, the
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| 332 | United Provinces had been without a ruler. The government had been
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| 333 | provisionally carried on by the "States," or deputies from each province.
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| 334 | Leicester had come with no other title than that of LieutenantGeneral of the
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| 335 | Queen's troops. But what the States wanted was not so much a military leader
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| 336 | as a sovereign ruler. They therefore urged Leicester to accept the powers
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| 337 | and title of Governor-General, the office which had been held by the
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| 338 | representatives of Philip. From this it would follow, both logically and
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| 339 | practically, that Elizabeth herself stood in the place of Philip--in other
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| 340 | words, that she was committed to the sovereignty which she had so
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| 341 | peremptorily refused. </p>
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| 342 | <p align="left">The offer was accepted by Leicester almost immediately after
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| 343 | his arrival (14/24 January 1586). There can be little doubt that it was a
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| 344 | preconcerted plan between the States and Elizabeth's ministers, who had all
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| 345 | along supported the Dutch proposals. Leicester, we know, had contemplated it
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| 346 | before leaving England. Davison, who was in Holland, hurried it on, and
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| 347 | undertook to carry the news to Elizabeth. Burghley and Walsingham maintained
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| 348 | that the step had been absolutely necessary, and implored her not to undo
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| 349 | it. Elizabeth herself had suspected that something of the sort would be
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| 350 | attempted, and had strictly enjoined Leicester at his departure to accept no
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| 351 | such title. It was not that she wished his powers--that is to say, her own
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| 352 | powers--to be circumscribed. On the contrary, she desired that they should
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| 353 | in practice be as large and absolute as possible. What she objected to was
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| 354 | the title, with all the consequences it involved. And what enraged her most
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| 355 | of all was the attempt of her servants to push the thing through behind her
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| 356 | back, on the calculation that she would be obliged to accept the
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| 357 | accomplished fact. Her wrath vented itself on all concerned, on her
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| 358 | ministers, on the States, and on Leicester. To the latter she addressed a
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| 359 | characteristic letter:-- </p>
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| 360 | <blockquote>
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| 361 | <p align="left">To my Lord of Leicester from the Queen by Sir Thomas
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| 362 | Heneage. </p>
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| 363 | <p align="left">"How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used
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| 364 | by you, you shall by this bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent
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| 365 | unto you to charge you withal. We could never have imagined, had we not
|
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| 366 | seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by ourself and
|
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| 367 | extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this land, would
|
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| 368 | have in so contemptible [contemptuous] a sort, broken our commandment, in
|
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| 369 | a cause that so greatly toucheth us in honour; whereof although you have
|
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| 370 | showed yourself to make but little account, in most undutiful a sort, you
|
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| 371 | may not therefore think that we have so little care of the reparation
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| 372 | thereof as we mind to pass so great a wrong in silence unredressed. And
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| 373 | therefore our express pleasure and command is that, all delays and excuses
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| 374 | laid apart, you do presently, on the duty of your allegiance, obey and
|
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| 375 | fulfil whatsoever the bearer hereof shall direct you to do in our name.
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| 376 | Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost
|
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| 377 | peril." </p>
|
|---|
| 378 | </blockquote>
|
|---|
| 379 | <p align="left">Nor were these cutting reproaches reserved for his private
|
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| 380 | perusal. She severely rebuked the States for encouraging "a creature of her
|
|---|
| 381 | own" to disobey her injunctions, and, as a reparation from them and from
|
|---|
| 382 | him, she required that he should make a public resignation of the government
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| 383 | in the place where he had accepted it. </p>
|
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| 384 | <p align="left">It is not to be wondered at that Elizabeth should think the
|
|---|
| 385 | vindication of her outraged authority to be the most pressing requirement of
|
|---|
| 386 | the moment. But the result was unfortunate for the object of the expedition.
|
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| 387 | The States had conferred "absolute" authority upon Leicester, and would have
|
|---|
| 388 | thought it a cheap price to pay if, by their adroit manuvre, they had
|
|---|
| 389 | succeeded in forcing the Queen's hand. But they did not care to intrust
|
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| 390 | absolute powers to a mere general of an English contingent. After long
|
|---|
| 391 | discussion, Elizabeth was at length persuaded that the least of evils was to
|
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| 392 | allow him to retain the title which the States had conferred on him ( June
|
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| 393 | 1586). But in the meantime they had repented of their haste in letting power
|
|---|
| 394 | go out of their own hands. Their efforts were thenceforth directed to
|
|---|
| 395 | explain away the term "absolute." The long displeasure of the Queen had
|
|---|
| 396 | destroyed the principal value of Leicester in their eye. He himself had soon
|
|---|
| 397 | incurred their dislike. Impetuous and domineering, he could not endure
|
|---|
| 398 | opposition. Every man who did not fall in with his plans was a malicious
|
|---|
| 399 | enemy, a traitor, a tool of Parma, who ought to be hanged. He still enjoyed
|
|---|
| 400 | the favour of the democratic and bigoted Calvinist party, especially in
|
|---|
| 401 | Utrecht, and he tried to play them off against the States, thereby promoting
|
|---|
| 402 | the rise of the factions which long afterwards distracted the United
|
|---|
| 403 | Provinces. The displeasures of the Queen had taken the shape of not sending
|
|---|
| 404 | him money, and his troops were in great distress and unable to move.
|
|---|
| 405 | Moreover, rumours of the secret peace negotiations were craftily spread by
|
|---|
| 406 | Parma, who, knowing well that they would come to nothing, turned them to the
|
|---|
| 407 | best account by leading the States to suspect that they were being betrayed
|
|---|
| 408 | to Spain. </p>
|
|---|
| 409 | <p align="left">Elizabeth had sent her army abroad more as a warning to
|
|---|
| 410 | Philip than with a view to active operations. It was no part of her plan to
|
|---|
| 411 | recover any of the territory already conquered by Parma, even if it had lain
|
|---|
| 412 | in her power. She knew that the majority of its inhabitants were Catholics
|
|---|
| 413 | and royalists. She knew also that Parma's attenuated army was considerably
|
|---|
| 414 | outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch forces, and that he was in dire distress for
|
|---|
| 415 | food and money. The recovered provinces were completely ruined by the war.
|
|---|
| 416 | Their commerce was swept from the sea. The mouths of their great rivers were
|
|---|
| 417 | blockaded. The Protestants of Flanders and Brabant had largely migrated to
|
|---|
| 418 | the unsubdued provinces, whose prosperity, notwithstanding the burdens of
|
|---|
| 419 | war, was advancing by leaps and bounds. Their population was about two
|
|---|
| 420 | millions. That of England itself was little more than four. Religion was no
|
|---|
| 421 | longer the only or the chief motive of their resistance. For even the
|
|---|
| 422 | Catholics among them, who were still very numerous--some said a majority
|
|---|
| 423 | --keenly relished the material prosperity which had grown with independence.
|
|---|
| 424 | Encouraged by English protection, the States were in no humour to listen to
|
|---|
| 425 | compromise. But a compromise was what Elizabeth desired. She was therefore
|
|---|
| 426 | not unwilling that her forces should be confined to an attitude of
|
|---|
| 427 | observation, till it should appear whether her open intervention would
|
|---|
| 428 | extract from Philip such concessions as she deemed reasonable. </p>
|
|---|
| 429 | <p align="left">Leicester was eager to get to work, and he was warmly
|
|---|
| 430 | supported by Walsingham. Burghley's conduct was less straightforward. He had
|
|---|
| 431 | long found it advisable to cultivate amicable relations with the favourite.
|
|---|
| 432 | He had probably concurred in the plan for making him Governor-General. Even
|
|---|
| 433 | now he was professing to take his part. In reality he was not sorry to see
|
|---|
| 434 | him under a cloud; and though he sympathised as much as ever with the Dutch,
|
|---|
| 435 | he cared more for crippling his rival. Hence his activity in those obscure
|
|---|
| 436 | peace negotiations which he so carefully concealed from Leicester and
|
|---|
| 437 | Walsingham. To keep Walsingham long in the dark, on that or any other
|
|---|
| 438 | subject, was indeed impossible. It was found necessary at last to let him be
|
|---|
| 439 | present at an interview with the agents employed by Burghley and Parma,
|
|---|
| 440 | which brought their backstairs diplomacy to an abrupt conclusion. "They that
|
|---|
| 441 | have been the employers of them," he wrote to Leicester, "are ashamed of the
|
|---|
| 442 | matter." The negotiations went on through other channels, but never made any
|
|---|
| 443 | serious progress. </p>
|
|---|
| 444 | <p align="left">To compel Philip to listen to a compromise, without at the
|
|---|
| 445 | same time emboldening the Dutch to turn a deaf ear to it--such was the
|
|---|
| 446 | problem which Elizabeth had set herself. She therefore preferred to apply
|
|---|
| 447 | pressure in other quarters. Towards the end of 1585, Drake appeared on the
|
|---|
| 448 | coast of Spain itself, and plundered Vigo. Then crossing the Atlantic, he
|
|---|
| 449 | sacked and burned St. Domingo and Carthagena. Again in 1587, he forced his
|
|---|
| 450 | way into Cadiz harbour, burnt all the shipping and the stores collected for
|
|---|
| 451 | the Armada, and for two months plundered and destroyed every vessel he met
|
|---|
| 452 | off the coast of Portugal. </p>
|
|---|
| 453 | <p align="left">Philip had so long and so tamely submitted to the many
|
|---|
| 454 | injuries and indignities which Elizabeth heaped upon him, that it is not
|
|---|
| 455 | wonderful if she had come to think that he would never pluck up courage to
|
|---|
| 456 | retaliate. This time she was wrong. The conquest of England had always had
|
|---|
| 457 | its place in his overloaded programme. But it was to be in that hazy
|
|---|
| 458 | ever-receding future, when he should have put down the Dutch rebellion and
|
|---|
| 459 | neutralised France. Elizabeth's open intervention in the Netherlands at
|
|---|
| 460 | length induced him to change his plan. England, he now decided, must be
|
|---|
| 461 | first dealt with. </p>
|
|---|
| 462 | <p align="left">In the meantime, Parma's operations in the Netherlands were
|
|---|
| 463 | starved quite as much as Leicester's. Plundering excursions, two or three
|
|---|
| 464 | petty combats not deserving the name of battles, half-a-dozen small towns
|
|---|
| 465 | captured on one side or the other--such is the military record from the date
|
|---|
| 466 | of Elizabeth's intervention to the arrival of the Armada. Parma had somewhat
|
|---|
| 467 | the best of this work, such as it was. But the war in the Netherlands was
|
|---|
| 468 | practically stagnant. </p>
|
|---|
| 469 | <p align="left">At the end of the first year of Leicester's government,
|
|---|
| 470 | events of the highest importance obliged him to pay a visit to England (
|
|---|
| 471 | Nov. 1586). The Queen of Scots had been found guilty of conspiring to
|
|---|
| 472 | assassinate Elizabeth, and Parliament had been summoned to decide upon her
|
|---|
| 473 | fate. </p>
|
|---|
| 474 | </font>
|
|---|
| 475 | <hr>
|
|---|
| 476 | <p align="left"><font style="font-family: Times New Roman" size="2">From <i>
|
|---|
| 477 | Queen Elizabeth</i> by Edward Spencer Beesly. Published in London by
|
|---|
| 478 | Macmillan and Co., 1892.</font></p>
|
|---|
| 479 | </font>
|
|---|
| 480 | <font face="Times New Roman" size="2">
|
|---|
| 481 | </blockquote>
|
|---|
| 482 | </blockquote>
|
|---|
| 483 |
|
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| 484 | <p align="center">
|
|---|
| 485 | <a href="beeslychapternine.html">to Chapter
|
|---|
| 486 | IX: The Execution of the Queen of Scots: 1584-1587</a></p>
|
|---|
| 487 | <p align="center">
|
|---|
| 488 | <a href="monarchs/eliz1.html">to the Queen
|
|---|
| 489 | Elizabeth I website</a> /
|
|---|
| 490 | <a href="relative/maryqos.html">to the Mary,
|
|---|
| 491 | queen of Scots website</a></p>
|
|---|
| 492 | <p align="center"><a href="secondary.html">
|
|---|
| 493 | to Secondary Sources</a></p>
|
|---|
| 494 | </font>
|
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| 495 |
|
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| 496 | </body>
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| 497 |
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