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    <Metadata name="Content">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
    <Metadata name="Page_topic">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
    <Metadata name="Author">Marilee Mongello</Metadata>
    <Metadata name="Title">Secondary Sources: Queen Elizabeth by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892: Chapter VIII</Metadata>
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    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;7&quot;&gt;Queen Elizabeth&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
    &lt;font size=&quot;4&quot;&gt;by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;img border=&quot;2&quot; src=&quot;_httpdocimg_/eliz1-ermine.jpg&quot; width=&quot;400&quot; height=&quot;478&quot; alt=&quot;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas Hilliard&quot;&gt;&lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;i&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas 
    Hilliard;&lt;br&gt;from the &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=0&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fwww.marileecody.com%2feliz1-images.html&quot;&gt;Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I&lt;/a&gt; website&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
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    &lt;div align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;
      &lt;b&gt;CHAPTER VIII&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br&gt;
      &lt;b&gt;THE PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS: 1584-86&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;WE are now approaching the great crisis of the reign, some 
    may think of English history--the grand struggle with Spain; a struggle 
    which, if Elizabeth had allowed herself to be guided by her most celebrated 
    counsellors, would have been entered upon a quarter of a century earlier. 
    England was then unarmed and weighed down with a load of debt, the legacy of 
    three thriftless and pugnacious reigns. The population was still mainly 
    Catholic. The great nobles still thought themselves a match for the crown, 
    and many of them longed to make one more effort to assert their old position 
    in the State. Trade and industry were languishing. The poorer classes were 
    suffering and discontented. Scotland was in the hands of a most dangerous 
    enemy, whose title to the English crown was held by many to be better than 
    Elizabeth's. Philip II., as yet unharassed by revolt, seemed almost to have 
    drawn England as a sort of satellite into the vast orbit of his empire. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Nearly a generation had now passed away since Elizabeth 
    ascended the throne. Every year of it had seen some amendment in the 
    condition of the country. Under a pacific and thrifty Government taxation 
    had been light beyond precedent. All debts, even those of Henry VIII., had 
    been honourably paid off. While the lord of American gold mines and of the 
    richest commercial centres in Europe could not raise a loan on any terms, 
    Elizabeth could borrow when she pleased at five per cent. But she had ceased 
    to borrow, for she had a modest surplus stored in her treasury, a department 
    of the administration managed under her own close personal supervision. A 
    numerous militia had been enrolled and partially trained. Large magazines of 
    arms had been accumulated. A navy had been created; not a large one indeed; 
    but it did not need to be large, for the warship of those days did not 
    differ from the ordinary vessel of commerce, nor was its crew differently 
    trained. The royal navy could therefore be indefinitely increased if need 
    arose. Philip's great generals, Alva and Parma, had long come to the 
    conclusion that the conquest of England would be the most difficult 
    enterprise their master could undertake. The wealth of landed proprietors 
    and traders had increased enormously. New manufactures had been started by 
    exiles from the Netherlands. New branches of foreign commerce had been 
    opened up. The poor were well employed and contented. I believe it would be 
    impossible to find in the previous history of England, or, for that matter, 
    of Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, any instance of peace, 
    prosperity, and good government extending over so many years. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Looking abroad we find that in all directions the strength 
    and security of Elizabeth's position had been immensely increased. Her 
    ministers, especially Walsingham--for Burghley in his old age came at last 
    to see more with the eyes of his mistress--believed that by a more spirited 
    policy Scotland might have been converted into a submissive and valuable 
    ally. Elizabeth alone saw that this was impossible; that, so treated, 
    Scotland would become to England what Holland was to Philip, what &amp;quot;the 
    Spanish ulcer&amp;quot; was afterwards to Napoleon--a fatal drain on her strength and 
    resources. It was enough for Elizabeth if the northern kingdom was so 
    handled as to be harmless; and this, as I have shown, was in fact its 
    condition from the moment that the only Scottish ruler who could be really 
    dangerous was locked up in England. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The Dutch revolt crippled Philip. The conquest of England 
    was postponed till the Dutch revolt should be suppressed. Why then, it has 
    been asked, did not Elizabeth support the Dutch more vigorously? The answer 
    is a simple one. If she had done so the suppression of the Dutch revolt 
    would have been postponed to the conquest of England. This is proved by the 
    events now to be related. Elizabeth was obliged by new circumstances to 
    intervene more vigorously in the Netherlands, and the result was the Armada. 
    If the attack had come ten or fifteen years earlier the fortune of England 
    might have been different. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth's foreign policy has been judged unfavourably by 
    writers who have failed to keep in view how completely it turned on her 
    relations with France. Though her interests and those of Henry III cannot be 
    called identical, they coincided sufficiently to make it possible to keep up 
    a good understanding which was of the highest advantage to both countries. 
    But to maintain this good understanding there was need of the coolest temper 
    and judgment on the part of the rulers; for the two peoples were hopelessly 
    hostile. They were like two gamecocks in adjoining pens. The Spaniards were 
    respected and liked by our countrymen. Their grave dignity, even their stiff 
    assumption of intrinsic superiority, were too like our own not to awake a 
    certain appreciative sympathy. Whereas all Englishmen from peer to peasant 
    would at any time have enjoyed a tussle with France, until its burdens began 
    to be felt. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Henry III, with whom the Valois dynasty was about to expire, 
    was far from being the incompetent driveller depicted by most historians. He 
    had good abilities, plenty of natural courage when roused, and a thorough 
    comprehension of the politics of his day. His aims and plans were well 
    conceived. But with no child to care for, and immersed in degrading 
    self-indulgence, he wearied of the exertions and sacrifices necessary for 
    carrying them through. Short spells of sensible and energetic action were 
    succeeded by periods of unworthy lassitude and pusillanimous surrender. 
    Before he came to the throne he had been the chief organiser of the 
    Bartholomew Massacre. As King he naturally inclined, like Elizabeth, William 
    of Orange, and Henry of Navarre, to make considerations of religion 
    subordinate to considerations of State. Both he and Navarre would have been 
    glad to throw over the fanatical or factious partisans by whom they were 
    surrounded, and rally the &lt;i&gt;Politiques&lt;/i&gt; to their support. But it was a 
    step that neither as yet ventured openly to take. The one was obliged to 
    affect zeal for the old religion, the other for the new. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth's ministers, with short-sighted animosity, had 
    been urging her throughout her reign to give vigorous support to the 
    Huguenots. She herself took a broader view of the situation. She preferred 
    to deal with the legitimate government of France recognised by the vast 
    majority of Frenchmen. Henry III., as she well knew, did not intend or 
    desire to exterminate the Huguenots. If that turbulent faction had been 
    openly abetted in its arrogant claims by English assistance, he would have 
    been obliged to become the mere instrument of Elizabeth's worst enemies, 
    Guise and the Holy League. France would have ceased to be any counterpoise 
    to Spain. The English Queen had so skilfully played a most difficult and 
    delicate game that Henry of Navarre had been able to keep his head above 
    water; Guise had upon the whole been held in check; the royal authority, 
    though impaired, had still controlled the foreign policy of France, and so, 
    since 1572, had given England a firm and useful ally. As long as this 
    balanced situation could be maintained, England was safe. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;But the time was now at hand when this nice equilibrium of 
    forces would be disturbed by events which neither Elizabeth nor any one else 
    could help. Alençon, the last of the Valois line, was dying. When he should 
    be gone, the next heir to the French King would be no other than the 
    Huguenot Henry of Bourbon, King of the tiny morsel of Navarre that lay north 
    of the Pyrenees. Henry III. wished to recognise his right. But it was 
    impossible that Guise or Philip, or the French nation itself, should 
    tolerate this prospect. Thus the great war of religion which Elizabeth had 
    so carefully abstained from stirring up was now inevitable. The French 
    alliance, the key-stone of her policy, was about to crumble away with the 
    authority of the French King which she had buttressed up. He would be 
    compelled either to become the mere instrument of the Papal party or to 
    combine openly with the Huguenot leader. In either case, Guise, not Henry 
    III., would be the virtual sovereign, and Elizabeth's alliance would not be 
    with France but with a French faction. She would thus be forced into the 
    position which she had hitherto refused to accept--that of sole protector of 
    French and Dutch Protestants, and open antagonist of Spain. The more showy 
    part she was now to play has been the chief foundation of her glory with 
    posterity. It is a glory which she deserves. The most industrious 
    disparagement will never rob her of it. But the sober student will be of 
    opinion that her reputation as a statesman has a more solid basis in the 
    skill and firmness with which during so many years she staved off the 
    necessity for decisive action. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Although the discovery of the Throgmorton plot (November 
    1583), and the consequent expulsion of the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were 
    not immediately followed by open war between England and Spain, yet the 
    course of events thenceforward tended directly to that issue. Elizabeth 
    immediately proposed to the Dutch States to form a naval alliance against 
    Spain, and to concert other measures for mutual defence. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Orange met the offer with alacrity, and pressed Elizabeth to 
    accept the sovereignty of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Perhaps there was 
    no former ruler of England who would not have clutched at such an 
    opportunity of territorial aggrandisement. For Elizabeth it had no charms. 
    Every sensible person now will applaud the sobriety of her aims. But though 
    she eschewed territory, she desired to have military occupation of one or 
    more coast fortresses, at all events for a time, both as a security for the 
    fidelity of the Dutch to any engagements they might make with her, and to 
    enable her to treat on more equal terms with France or Spain, if the 
    Netherlands were destined, after all, to fall into the hands of one of those 
    powers. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;While these negotiations were in progress, William of Orange 
    was murdered (1584). Alençon had died a month earlier. The sovereignty of 
    the revolted Netherlands was thus vacant. Elizabeth advised a joint 
    protectorate by France and England. But the Dutch had small confidence in 
    protectorates, especially of the joint kind. What they wanted was a 
    sovereign, and as Elizabeth would not accept them as her subjects they 
    offered themselves to Henry III. But after nibbling at the offer for eight 
    months Henry was obliged to refuse it. His openly expressed intention to 
    recognise the King of Navarre as his heir had caused a revival of the Holy 
    League. During the winter 1584-5 its reorganisation was busily going on. 
    Philip promised to subsidise it. Mendoza, now ambassador at Paris, was its 
    life and soul. The insurrection was on the point of breaking out. Henry III 
    knew that the vast majority of Frenchmen were Catholics. To accept the Dutch 
    offer would, he feared, drive them all into the ranks of the Holy League. He 
    therefore dismissed the Dutch envoys with the recommendation that they 
    should apply to England for protection (1585). The manifesto of the Leaguers 
    appeared at the end of March (1585). Henry of Navarre was declared 
    incapable, as a Protestant, of succeeding to the crown. Henry III. was 
    summoned to extirpate heresy. To enforce these demands the Leaguers flew to 
    arms all over France. Had Henry III. been a man of spirit he would have 
    placed himself at the head of the loyal Catholics and fought it out. But by 
    the compact of Nemours he conceded all the demands of the League (1585). &lt;/p&gt;
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    &lt;p&gt;Thus began the last great war of religion, which lasted till Henry of 
    Navarre was firmly seated on the throne of France. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth had now finally lost the French alliance, the 
    sheet-anchor of her policy since 1572, and she prepared for the grand 
    struggle which could no longer be averted. As France failed her, she must 
    make the best of the Dutch alliance. She did not conceal from herself that 
    she would have to do her share of the fighting. But she was determined that 
    the Dutch should also do theirs. Deprived of all hope of help from France 
    they wished for annexation to the English crown, because solidarity between 
    the two countries would give them an unlimited claim upon English resources. 
    Elizabeth uniformly told them, first and last, that nothing should induce 
    her to accept that proposal. She would give them a definite amount of
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    assistance in men and money. But every farthing would have to be repaid when 
    the war was over; and in the meantime she must have Flushing and Brill as 
    security. They must also bind themselves to make proper exertions in their 
    own defence. Gilpin, her agent in Zealand, had warned her that if she showed 
    herself too forward they would simply throw the whole burden of the war upon 
    her. Splendid as had often been the resistance of separate towns when 
    besieged, there had been, from the first, lamentable selfishness and apathy 
    as to measures for combined defence. The States had less than 6000 men in 
    the field--half of them English volunteers--at the very time when they were 
    assuring Elizabeth that, if she would come to their assistance, they could 
    and would furnish 15,000. She was justified in regarding their fine promises 
    with much distrust. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;While this discussion was going on, Antwerp was lost. The 
    blame of the delay, if blame there was, must be divided equally between the 
    bargainers. The truth is that, cavil as they might about details, the 
    strength of the English contingent was not the real object of concern to 
    either of them. Each was thinking of something else. Though Elizabeth had so 
    peremptorily refused the sovereignty offered by the United Provinces, they 
    were still bent on forcing it upon her. She, on the other hand, had not 
    given up the hope that her more decisive intervention would drive Philip to 
    make the concessions to his revolted subjects which she had so often urged 
    upon him. In her eyes, Philip's sovereignty over them was indefeasible. They 
    were, perhaps, justified in asserting their ancient constitutional rights 
    But if those were guaranteed, continuance of the rebellion would be 
    criminal. Moreover, she held that elected deputies were but amateur 
    statesmen, and had better leave the &lt;i&gt;haute politique&lt;/i&gt; to princes to 
    settle. &amp;quot;Princes,&amp;quot; she once told a Dutch deputation, &amp;quot;are not to be charged 
    with breach of faith if they sometimes listen to both sides; for they 
    transact business in a princely way and with a princely understanding such 
    as private persons cannot have.&amp;quot; Her promise not to make peace behind their 
    backs was not to be interpreted as literally as if it had been made to a 
    brother prince. It merely bound her--so she contended--not to make peace 
    without safeguarding their interests; that is to say, what she considered to 
    be their true interests. Conduct based on such a theory would not be 
    tolerated now, and was not tamely acquiesced in by the Dutch then. But to 
    speak of it as base and treacherous is an abuse of terms. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It would be impossible to follow in detail the peace 
    negotiations which went on between Elizabeth and Parma up to the very 
    sailing of the Armada (1586-8). The terms on which the Queen was prepared to 
    make peace never varied substantially from first to last. We know very well 
    what they were. She claimed for the Protestants of the Netherlands (who were 
    a minority, perhaps, even in the rebel provinces) precisely the same degree 
    of toleration which she allowed to her own Catholics. They were not to be 
    questioned about their religion; but there was to be no public worship or 
    proselytising. The old constitution, as before Alva, was to be restored, 
    which would have involved the departure of the foreign troops. These terms 
    would not have satisfied the States, and if Philip could have been induced 
    to grant them, the States and Elizabeth must have parted company. But, as he 
    would make no concessions, the Anglo-Dutch alliance could, and did, 
    continue. The cautionary towns she was determined never to give up to any 
    one unless (first) she was repaid her expenses for which they had been 
    mortgaged, and (secondly) the struggle in the Netherlands was brought to an 
    end on terms which she approved. There was, therefore, never any danger of 
    their being surrendered to Philip, and they did, in fact, remain in 
    Elizabeth's hands till her death. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth has been severely censured for selecting Leicester 
    to command the English army in the Netherlands. It is certain that he was 
    marked out by public opinion as the fittest person. The Queen's choice was 
    heartily approved by all her ministers, especially by Walsingham, who kept 
    up the most confidential relations with Leicester, and backed him 
    throughout. Custom prescribed that an English army should be commanded, not 
    by a professional soldier, but by a great nobleman. Among the nobility there 
    were a few who had done a little soldiering in a rough way in Scotland or 
    Ireland, but no one who could be called a professional general. The 
    momentous step which Elizabeth was taking would have lost half its 
    significance in the eyes of Europe if any less conspicuous person than 
    Leicester had been appointed. Moreover, it was essential that the nobleman 
    selected should be able and willing to spend largely out of his own 
    resources. By traditional usage, derived from feudal times, peers who were 
    employed on temporary services not only received no salary, but were 
    expected to defray their own expenses, and defray them handsomely. Never did 
    an English nobleman show more public spirit in this respect than Leicester. 
    He raised every penny he could by mortgaging his estates. He not only paid 
    his own personal expenses, but advanced large sums for military purposes, 
    which his mistress never thought of repaying him. If he effected little as a 
    general, it was because he was not provided with the means. Serious mistakes 
    he certainly made, but they were not of a military kind. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Leicester was now fifty-four, bald, white-bearded, and 
    red-faced, but still imposing in figure, carriage, and dress. To Elizabeth 
    he was dear as the friend of her youth, one who, she was persuaded, had 
    loved her for herself when they were both thirty years younger, and was 
    still her most devoted and trustworthy servant. Burghley she liked and 
    trusted, and all the more since he had become a more docile instrument of 
    her policy. Walsingham, a keener intellect and more independent character, 
    she could not but value, though impatient under his penetrating suspicion 
    and almost constant disapproval. Leicester was the intimate friend, the 
    frequent companion of her leisure hours. None of her younger favourites had 
    supplanted him in her regard. By long intimacy he knew the &lt;i&gt;molles aditus 
    et tempora&lt;/i&gt; when things might be said without offence which were not 
    acceptable at the council-board. The other ministers were glad to use him 
    for this purpose. There can be no question that his appointment to the 
    command in the Netherlands was meant as the most decisive indication that 
    could be given of Elizabeth's determination to face open war with Philip 
    rather than allow him to establish absolute government in that country. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Since the deaths of Alençon and William of Orange, the 
    United Provinces had been without a ruler. The government had been 
    provisionally carried on by the &amp;quot;States,&amp;quot; or deputies from each province. 
    Leicester had come with no other title than that of LieutenantGeneral of the 
    Queen's troops. But what the States wanted was not so much a military leader 
    as a sovereign ruler. They therefore urged Leicester to accept the powers 
    and title of Governor-General, the office which had been held by the 
    representatives of Philip. From this it would follow, both logically and 
    practically, that Elizabeth herself stood in the place of Philip--in other 
    words, that she was committed to the sovereignty which she had so 
    peremptorily refused. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The offer was accepted by Leicester almost immediately after 
    his arrival (14/24 January 1586). There can be little doubt that it was a 
    preconcerted plan between the States and Elizabeth's ministers, who had all 
    along supported the Dutch proposals. Leicester, we know, had contemplated it 
    before leaving England. Davison, who was in Holland, hurried it on, and 
    undertook to carry the news to Elizabeth. Burghley and Walsingham maintained 
    that the step had been absolutely necessary, and implored her not to undo 
    it. Elizabeth herself had suspected that something of the sort would be 
    attempted, and had strictly enjoined Leicester at his departure to accept no 
    such title. It was not that she wished his powers--that is to say, her own 
    powers--to be circumscribed. On the contrary, she desired that they should 
    in practice be as large and absolute as possible. What she objected to was 
    the title, with all the consequences it involved. And what enraged her most 
    of all was the attempt of her servants to push the thing through behind her 
    back, on the calculation that she would be obliged to accept the 
    accomplished fact. Her wrath vented itself on all concerned, on her 
    ministers, on the States, and on Leicester. To the latter she addressed a 
    characteristic letter:-- &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;blockquote&gt;
      &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;To my Lord of Leicester from the Queen by Sir Thomas 
      Heneage. &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&amp;quot;How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used 
      by you, you shall by this bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent 
      unto you to charge you withal. We could never have imagined, had we not 
      seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by ourself and 
      extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this land, would 
      have in so contemptible [contemptuous] a sort, broken our commandment, in 
      a cause that so greatly toucheth us in honour; whereof although you have 
      showed yourself to make but little account, in most undutiful a sort, you 
      may not therefore think that we have so little care of the reparation 
      thereof as we mind to pass so great a wrong in silence unredressed. And 
      therefore our express pleasure and command is that, all delays and excuses 
      laid apart, you do presently, on the duty of your allegiance, obey and 
      fulfil whatsoever the bearer hereof shall direct you to do in our name. 
      Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost 
      peril.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/blockquote&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Nor were these cutting reproaches reserved for his private 
    perusal. She severely rebuked the States for encouraging &amp;quot;a creature of her 
    own&amp;quot; to disobey her injunctions, and, as a reparation from them and from 
    him, she required that he should make a public resignation of the government 
    in the place where he had accepted it. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It is not to be wondered at that Elizabeth should think the 
    vindication of her outraged authority to be the most pressing requirement of 
    the moment. But the result was unfortunate for the object of the expedition. 
    The States had conferred &amp;quot;absolute&amp;quot; authority upon Leicester, and would have 
    thought it a cheap price to pay if, by their adroit manœuvre, they had 
    succeeded in forcing the Queen's hand. But they did not care to intrust 
    absolute powers to a mere general of an English contingent. After long 
    discussion, Elizabeth was at length persuaded that the least of evils was to 
    allow him to retain the title which the States had conferred on him ( June 
    1586). But in the meantime they had repented of their haste in letting power 
    go out of their own hands. Their efforts were thenceforth directed to 
    explain away the term &amp;quot;absolute.&amp;quot; The long displeasure of the Queen had 
    destroyed the principal value of Leicester in their eye. He himself had soon 
    incurred their dislike. Impetuous and domineering, he could not endure 
    opposition. Every man who did not fall in with his plans was a malicious 
    enemy, a traitor, a tool of Parma, who ought to be hanged. He still enjoyed 
    the favour of the democratic and bigoted Calvinist party, especially in 
    Utrecht, and he tried to play them off against the States, thereby promoting 
    the rise of the factions which long afterwards distracted the United 
    Provinces. The displeasures of the Queen had taken the shape of not sending 
    him money, and his troops were in great distress and unable to move. 
    Moreover, rumours of the secret peace negotiations were craftily spread by 
    Parma, who, knowing well that they would come to nothing, turned them to the 
    best account by leading the States to suspect that they were being betrayed 
    to Spain. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth had sent her army abroad more as a warning to 
    Philip than with a view to active operations. It was no part of her plan to 
    recover any of the territory already conquered by Parma, even if it had lain 
    in her power. She knew that the majority of its inhabitants were Catholics 
    and royalists. She knew also that Parma's attenuated army was considerably 
    outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch forces, and that he was in dire distress for 
    food and money. The recovered provinces were completely ruined by the war. 
    Their commerce was swept from the sea. The mouths of their great rivers were 
    blockaded. The Protestants of Flanders and Brabant had largely migrated to 
    the unsubdued provinces, whose prosperity, notwithstanding the burdens of 
    war, was advancing by leaps and bounds. Their population was about two 
    millions. That of England itself was little more than four. Religion was no 
    longer the only or the chief motive of their resistance. For even the 
    Catholics among them, who were still very numerous--some said a majority 
    --keenly relished the material prosperity which had grown with independence. 
    Encouraged by English protection, the States were in no humour to listen to 
    compromise. But a compromise was what Elizabeth desired. She was therefore 
    not unwilling that her forces should be confined to an attitude of 
    observation, till it should appear whether her open intervention would 
    extract from Philip such concessions as she deemed reasonable. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Leicester was eager to get to work, and he was warmly 
    supported by Walsingham. Burghley's conduct was less straightforward. He had 
    long found it advisable to cultivate amicable relations with the favourite. 
    He had probably concurred in the plan for making him Governor-General. Even 
    now he was professing to take his part. In reality he was not sorry to see 
    him under a cloud; and though he sympathised as much as ever with the Dutch, 
    he cared more for crippling his rival. Hence his activity in those obscure 
    peace negotiations which he so carefully concealed from Leicester and 
    Walsingham. To keep Walsingham long in the dark, on that or any other 
    subject, was indeed impossible. It was found necessary at last to let him be 
    present at an interview with the agents employed by Burghley and Parma, 
    which brought their backstairs diplomacy to an abrupt conclusion. &amp;quot;They that 
    have been the employers of them,&amp;quot; he wrote to Leicester, &amp;quot;are ashamed of the 
    matter.&amp;quot; The negotiations went on through other channels, but never made any 
    serious progress. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;To compel Philip to listen to a compromise, without at the 
    same time emboldening the Dutch to turn a deaf ear to it--such was the 
    problem which Elizabeth had set herself. She therefore preferred to apply 
    pressure in other quarters. Towards the end of 1585, Drake appeared on the 
    coast of Spain itself, and plundered Vigo. Then crossing the Atlantic, he 
    sacked and burned St. Domingo and Carthagena. Again in 1587, he forced his 
    way into Cadiz harbour, burnt all the shipping and the stores collected for 
    the Armada, and for two months plundered and destroyed every vessel he met 
    off the coast of Portugal. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Philip had so long and so tamely submitted to the many 
    injuries and indignities which Elizabeth heaped upon him, that it is not 
    wonderful if she had come to think that he would never pluck up courage to 
    retaliate. This time she was wrong. The conquest of England had always had 
    its place in his overloaded programme. But it was to be in that hazy 
    ever-receding future, when he should have put down the Dutch rebellion and 
    neutralised France. Elizabeth's open intervention in the Netherlands at 
    length induced him to change his plan. England, he now decided, must be 
    first dealt with. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;In the meantime, Parma's operations in the Netherlands were 
    starved quite as much as Leicester's. Plundering excursions, two or three 
    petty combats not deserving the name of battles, half-a-dozen small towns 
    captured on one side or the other--such is the military record from the date 
    of Elizabeth's intervention to the arrival of the Armada. Parma had somewhat 
    the best of this work, such as it was. But the war in the Netherlands was 
    practically stagnant. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;At the end of the first year of Leicester's government, 
    events of the highest importance obliged him to pay a visit to England ( 
    Nov. 1586). The Queen of Scots had been found guilty of conspiring to 
    assassinate Elizabeth, and Parliament had been summoned to decide upon her 
    fate. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
    &lt;hr&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;From &lt;i&gt;
    Queen Elizabeth&lt;/i&gt; by Edward Spencer Beesly.&amp;nbsp; Published in London by 
    Macmillan and Co., 1892.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;
  &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fbeeslychapternine.html&quot;&gt;to Chapter 
    IX: The Execution of the Queen of Scots: 1584-1587&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fmonarchs%2feliz1.html&quot;&gt;to the Queen 
    Elizabeth I website&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp; /&amp;nbsp;
    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2frelative%2fmaryqos.html&quot;&gt;to the Mary, 
    queen of Scots website&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fsecondary.html&quot;&gt;
    to Secondary Sources&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;/font&gt;
  


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