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14 <Metadata name="Content">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
15 <Metadata name="Page_topic">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
16 <Metadata name="Author">Marilee Mongello</Metadata>
17 <Metadata name="Title">Secondary Sources: Queen Elizabeth by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892: Chapter VIII</Metadata>
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31
32&lt;table border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;3&quot; width=&quot;100%&quot; height=&quot;667&quot;&gt;
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35 &lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot; height=&quot;29&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;
36 &lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot; height=&quot;29&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
37 &lt;/tr&gt;
38 &lt;tr&gt;
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44 &lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot; height=&quot;610&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
45 &lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot; height=&quot;610&quot;&gt;
46 &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;7&quot;&gt;Queen Elizabeth&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
47 &lt;font size=&quot;4&quot;&gt;by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
48 &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
49 &lt;img border=&quot;2&quot; src=&quot;_httpdocimg_/eliz1-ermine.jpg&quot; width=&quot;400&quot; height=&quot;478&quot; alt=&quot;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas Hilliard&quot;&gt;&lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
50 &lt;i&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas
51 Hilliard;&lt;br&gt;from the &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=0&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fwww.marileecody.com%2feliz1-images.html&quot;&gt;Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I&lt;/a&gt; website&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
52 &lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot; height=&quot;610&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
53 &lt;/tr&gt;
54&lt;/table&gt;
55&lt;blockquote&gt;
56 &lt;blockquote&gt;
57 &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif&quot;&gt;
58 &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot;&gt;&lt;/font&gt;
59 &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot;&gt;&lt;/font&gt;
60 &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot;&gt;&lt;/font&gt;
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62 &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
63 &lt;div align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;
64 &lt;b&gt;CHAPTER VIII&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br&gt;
65 &lt;b&gt;THE PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS: 1584-86&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
66 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;WE are now approaching the great crisis of the reign, some
67 may think of English history--the grand struggle with Spain; a struggle
68 which, if Elizabeth had allowed herself to be guided by her most celebrated
69 counsellors, would have been entered upon a quarter of a century earlier.
70 England was then unarmed and weighed down with a load of debt, the legacy of
71 three thriftless and pugnacious reigns. The population was still mainly
72 Catholic. The great nobles still thought themselves a match for the crown,
73 and many of them longed to make one more effort to assert their old position
74 in the State. Trade and industry were languishing. The poorer classes were
75 suffering and discontented. Scotland was in the hands of a most dangerous
76 enemy, whose title to the English crown was held by many to be better than
77 Elizabeth's. Philip II., as yet unharassed by revolt, seemed almost to have
78 drawn England as a sort of satellite into the vast orbit of his empire. &lt;/p&gt;
79 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Nearly a generation had now passed away since Elizabeth
80 ascended the throne. Every year of it had seen some amendment in the
81 condition of the country. Under a pacific and thrifty Government taxation
82 had been light beyond precedent. All debts, even those of Henry VIII., had
83 been honourably paid off. While the lord of American gold mines and of the
84 richest commercial centres in Europe could not raise a loan on any terms,
85 Elizabeth could borrow when she pleased at five per cent. But she had ceased
86 to borrow, for she had a modest surplus stored in her treasury, a department
87 of the administration managed under her own close personal supervision. A
88 numerous militia had been enrolled and partially trained. Large magazines of
89 arms had been accumulated. A navy had been created; not a large one indeed;
90 but it did not need to be large, for the warship of those days did not
91 differ from the ordinary vessel of commerce, nor was its crew differently
92 trained. The royal navy could therefore be indefinitely increased if need
93 arose. Philip's great generals, Alva and Parma, had long come to the
94 conclusion that the conquest of England would be the most difficult
95 enterprise their master could undertake. The wealth of landed proprietors
96 and traders had increased enormously. New manufactures had been started by
97 exiles from the Netherlands. New branches of foreign commerce had been
98 opened up. The poor were well employed and contented. I believe it would be
99 impossible to find in the previous history of England, or, for that matter,
100 of Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, any instance of peace,
101 prosperity, and good government extending over so many years. &lt;/p&gt;
102 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Looking abroad we find that in all directions the strength
103 and security of Elizabeth's position had been immensely increased. Her
104 ministers, especially Walsingham--for Burghley in his old age came at last
105 to see more with the eyes of his mistress--believed that by a more spirited
106 policy Scotland might have been converted into a submissive and valuable
107 ally. Elizabeth alone saw that this was impossible; that, so treated,
108 Scotland would become to England what Holland was to Philip, what &amp;quot;the
109 Spanish ulcer&amp;quot; was afterwards to Napoleon--a fatal drain on her strength and
110 resources. It was enough for Elizabeth if the northern kingdom was so
111 handled as to be harmless; and this, as I have shown, was in fact its
112 condition from the moment that the only Scottish ruler who could be really
113 dangerous was locked up in England. &lt;/p&gt;
114 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The Dutch revolt crippled Philip. The conquest of England
115 was postponed till the Dutch revolt should be suppressed. Why then, it has
116 been asked, did not Elizabeth support the Dutch more vigorously? The answer
117 is a simple one. If she had done so the suppression of the Dutch revolt
118 would have been postponed to the conquest of England. This is proved by the
119 events now to be related. Elizabeth was obliged by new circumstances to
120 intervene more vigorously in the Netherlands, and the result was the Armada.
121 If the attack had come ten or fifteen years earlier the fortune of England
122 might have been different. &lt;/p&gt;
123 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth's foreign policy has been judged unfavourably by
124 writers who have failed to keep in view how completely it turned on her
125 relations with France. Though her interests and those of Henry III cannot be
126 called identical, they coincided sufficiently to make it possible to keep up
127 a good understanding which was of the highest advantage to both countries.
128 But to maintain this good understanding there was need of the coolest temper
129 and judgment on the part of the rulers; for the two peoples were hopelessly
130 hostile. They were like two gamecocks in adjoining pens. The Spaniards were
131 respected and liked by our countrymen. Their grave dignity, even their stiff
132 assumption of intrinsic superiority, were too like our own not to awake a
133 certain appreciative sympathy. Whereas all Englishmen from peer to peasant
134 would at any time have enjoyed a tussle with France, until its burdens began
135 to be felt. &lt;/p&gt;
136 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Henry III, with whom the Valois dynasty was about to expire,
137 was far from being the incompetent driveller depicted by most historians. He
138 had good abilities, plenty of natural courage when roused, and a thorough
139 comprehension of the politics of his day. His aims and plans were well
140 conceived. But with no child to care for, and immersed in degrading
141 self-indulgence, he wearied of the exertions and sacrifices necessary for
142 carrying them through. Short spells of sensible and energetic action were
143 succeeded by periods of unworthy lassitude and pusillanimous surrender.
144 Before he came to the throne he had been the chief organiser of the
145 Bartholomew Massacre. As King he naturally inclined, like Elizabeth, William
146 of Orange, and Henry of Navarre, to make considerations of religion
147 subordinate to considerations of State. Both he and Navarre would have been
148 glad to throw over the fanatical or factious partisans by whom they were
149 surrounded, and rally the &lt;i&gt;Politiques&lt;/i&gt; to their support. But it was a
150 step that neither as yet ventured openly to take. The one was obliged to
151 affect zeal for the old religion, the other for the new. &lt;/p&gt;
152 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth's ministers, with short-sighted animosity, had
153 been urging her throughout her reign to give vigorous support to the
154 Huguenots. She herself took a broader view of the situation. She preferred
155 to deal with the legitimate government of France recognised by the vast
156 majority of Frenchmen. Henry III., as she well knew, did not intend or
157 desire to exterminate the Huguenots. If that turbulent faction had been
158 openly abetted in its arrogant claims by English assistance, he would have
159 been obliged to become the mere instrument of Elizabeth's worst enemies,
160 Guise and the Holy League. France would have ceased to be any counterpoise
161 to Spain. The English Queen had so skilfully played a most difficult and
162 delicate game that Henry of Navarre had been able to keep his head above
163 water; Guise had upon the whole been held in check; the royal authority,
164 though impaired, had still controlled the foreign policy of France, and so,
165 since 1572, had given England a firm and useful ally. As long as this
166 balanced situation could be maintained, England was safe. &lt;/p&gt;
167 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;But the time was now at hand when this nice equilibrium of
168 forces would be disturbed by events which neither Elizabeth nor any one else
169 could help. Alençon, the last of the Valois line, was dying. When he should
170 be gone, the next heir to the French King would be no other than the
171 Huguenot Henry of Bourbon, King of the tiny morsel of Navarre that lay north
172 of the Pyrenees. Henry III. wished to recognise his right. But it was
173 impossible that Guise or Philip, or the French nation itself, should
174 tolerate this prospect. Thus the great war of religion which Elizabeth had
175 so carefully abstained from stirring up was now inevitable. The French
176 alliance, the key-stone of her policy, was about to crumble away with the
177 authority of the French King which she had buttressed up. He would be
178 compelled either to become the mere instrument of the Papal party or to
179 combine openly with the Huguenot leader. In either case, Guise, not Henry
180 III., would be the virtual sovereign, and Elizabeth's alliance would not be
181 with France but with a French faction. She would thus be forced into the
182 position which she had hitherto refused to accept--that of sole protector of
183 French and Dutch Protestants, and open antagonist of Spain. The more showy
184 part she was now to play has been the chief foundation of her glory with
185 posterity. It is a glory which she deserves. The most industrious
186 disparagement will never rob her of it. But the sober student will be of
187 opinion that her reputation as a statesman has a more solid basis in the
188 skill and firmness with which during so many years she staved off the
189 necessity for decisive action. &lt;/p&gt;
190 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Although the discovery of the Throgmorton plot (November
191 1583), and the consequent expulsion of the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were
192 not immediately followed by open war between England and Spain, yet the
193 course of events thenceforward tended directly to that issue. Elizabeth
194 immediately proposed to the Dutch States to form a naval alliance against
195 Spain, and to concert other measures for mutual defence. &lt;/p&gt;
196 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Orange met the offer with alacrity, and pressed Elizabeth to
197 accept the sovereignty of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Perhaps there was
198 no former ruler of England who would not have clutched at such an
199 opportunity of territorial aggrandisement. For Elizabeth it had no charms.
200 Every sensible person now will applaud the sobriety of her aims. But though
201 she eschewed territory, she desired to have military occupation of one or
202 more coast fortresses, at all events for a time, both as a security for the
203 fidelity of the Dutch to any engagements they might make with her, and to
204 enable her to treat on more equal terms with France or Spain, if the
205 Netherlands were destined, after all, to fall into the hands of one of those
206 powers. &lt;/p&gt;
207 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;While these negotiations were in progress, William of Orange
208 was murdered (1584). Alençon had died a month earlier. The sovereignty of
209 the revolted Netherlands was thus vacant. Elizabeth advised a joint
210 protectorate by France and England. But the Dutch had small confidence in
211 protectorates, especially of the joint kind. What they wanted was a
212 sovereign, and as Elizabeth would not accept them as her subjects they
213 offered themselves to Henry III. But after nibbling at the offer for eight
214 months Henry was obliged to refuse it. His openly expressed intention to
215 recognise the King of Navarre as his heir had caused a revival of the Holy
216 League. During the winter 1584-5 its reorganisation was busily going on.
217 Philip promised to subsidise it. Mendoza, now ambassador at Paris, was its
218 life and soul. The insurrection was on the point of breaking out. Henry III
219 knew that the vast majority of Frenchmen were Catholics. To accept the Dutch
220 offer would, he feared, drive them all into the ranks of the Holy League. He
221 therefore dismissed the Dutch envoys with the recommendation that they
222 should apply to England for protection (1585). The manifesto of the Leaguers
223 appeared at the end of March (1585). Henry of Navarre was declared
224 incapable, as a Protestant, of succeeding to the crown. Henry III. was
225 summoned to extirpate heresy. To enforce these demands the Leaguers flew to
226 arms all over France. Had Henry III. been a man of spirit he would have
227 placed himself at the head of the loyal Catholics and fought it out. But by
228 the compact of Nemours he conceded all the demands of the League (1585). &lt;/p&gt;
229 &lt;/font&gt;
230 &lt;/font&gt;
231 &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
232 &lt;p&gt;Thus began the last great war of religion, which lasted till Henry of
233 Navarre was firmly seated on the throne of France. &lt;/p&gt;
234 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth had now finally lost the French alliance, the
235 sheet-anchor of her policy since 1572, and she prepared for the grand
236 struggle which could no longer be averted. As France failed her, she must
237 make the best of the Dutch alliance. She did not conceal from herself that
238 she would have to do her share of the fighting. But she was determined that
239 the Dutch should also do theirs. Deprived of all hope of help from France
240 they wished for annexation to the English crown, because solidarity between
241 the two countries would give them an unlimited claim upon English resources.
242 Elizabeth uniformly told them, first and last, that nothing should induce
243 her to accept that proposal. She would give them a definite amount of
244 &lt;/font&gt;
245 &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif&quot;&gt;
246 &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
247 assistance in men and money. But every farthing would have to be repaid when
248 the war was over; and in the meantime she must have Flushing and Brill as
249 security. They must also bind themselves to make proper exertions in their
250 own defence. Gilpin, her agent in Zealand, had warned her that if she showed
251 herself too forward they would simply throw the whole burden of the war upon
252 her. Splendid as had often been the resistance of separate towns when
253 besieged, there had been, from the first, lamentable selfishness and apathy
254 as to measures for combined defence. The States had less than 6000 men in
255 the field--half of them English volunteers--at the very time when they were
256 assuring Elizabeth that, if she would come to their assistance, they could
257 and would furnish 15,000. She was justified in regarding their fine promises
258 with much distrust. &lt;/p&gt;
259 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;While this discussion was going on, Antwerp was lost. The
260 blame of the delay, if blame there was, must be divided equally between the
261 bargainers. The truth is that, cavil as they might about details, the
262 strength of the English contingent was not the real object of concern to
263 either of them. Each was thinking of something else. Though Elizabeth had so
264 peremptorily refused the sovereignty offered by the United Provinces, they
265 were still bent on forcing it upon her. She, on the other hand, had not
266 given up the hope that her more decisive intervention would drive Philip to
267 make the concessions to his revolted subjects which she had so often urged
268 upon him. In her eyes, Philip's sovereignty over them was indefeasible. They
269 were, perhaps, justified in asserting their ancient constitutional rights
270 But if those were guaranteed, continuance of the rebellion would be
271 criminal. Moreover, she held that elected deputies were but amateur
272 statesmen, and had better leave the &lt;i&gt;haute politique&lt;/i&gt; to princes to
273 settle. &amp;quot;Princes,&amp;quot; she once told a Dutch deputation, &amp;quot;are not to be charged
274 with breach of faith if they sometimes listen to both sides; for they
275 transact business in a princely way and with a princely understanding such
276 as private persons cannot have.&amp;quot; Her promise not to make peace behind their
277 backs was not to be interpreted as literally as if it had been made to a
278 brother prince. It merely bound her--so she contended--not to make peace
279 without safeguarding their interests; that is to say, what she considered to
280 be their true interests. Conduct based on such a theory would not be
281 tolerated now, and was not tamely acquiesced in by the Dutch then. But to
282 speak of it as base and treacherous is an abuse of terms. &lt;/p&gt;
283 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It would be impossible to follow in detail the peace
284 negotiations which went on between Elizabeth and Parma up to the very
285 sailing of the Armada (1586-8). The terms on which the Queen was prepared to
286 make peace never varied substantially from first to last. We know very well
287 what they were. She claimed for the Protestants of the Netherlands (who were
288 a minority, perhaps, even in the rebel provinces) precisely the same degree
289 of toleration which she allowed to her own Catholics. They were not to be
290 questioned about their religion; but there was to be no public worship or
291 proselytising. The old constitution, as before Alva, was to be restored,
292 which would have involved the departure of the foreign troops. These terms
293 would not have satisfied the States, and if Philip could have been induced
294 to grant them, the States and Elizabeth must have parted company. But, as he
295 would make no concessions, the Anglo-Dutch alliance could, and did,
296 continue. The cautionary towns she was determined never to give up to any
297 one unless (first) she was repaid her expenses for which they had been
298 mortgaged, and (secondly) the struggle in the Netherlands was brought to an
299 end on terms which she approved. There was, therefore, never any danger of
300 their being surrendered to Philip, and they did, in fact, remain in
301 Elizabeth's hands till her death. &lt;/p&gt;
302 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth has been severely censured for selecting Leicester
303 to command the English army in the Netherlands. It is certain that he was
304 marked out by public opinion as the fittest person. The Queen's choice was
305 heartily approved by all her ministers, especially by Walsingham, who kept
306 up the most confidential relations with Leicester, and backed him
307 throughout. Custom prescribed that an English army should be commanded, not
308 by a professional soldier, but by a great nobleman. Among the nobility there
309 were a few who had done a little soldiering in a rough way in Scotland or
310 Ireland, but no one who could be called a professional general. The
311 momentous step which Elizabeth was taking would have lost half its
312 significance in the eyes of Europe if any less conspicuous person than
313 Leicester had been appointed. Moreover, it was essential that the nobleman
314 selected should be able and willing to spend largely out of his own
315 resources. By traditional usage, derived from feudal times, peers who were
316 employed on temporary services not only received no salary, but were
317 expected to defray their own expenses, and defray them handsomely. Never did
318 an English nobleman show more public spirit in this respect than Leicester.
319 He raised every penny he could by mortgaging his estates. He not only paid
320 his own personal expenses, but advanced large sums for military purposes,
321 which his mistress never thought of repaying him. If he effected little as a
322 general, it was because he was not provided with the means. Serious mistakes
323 he certainly made, but they were not of a military kind. &lt;/p&gt;
324 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Leicester was now fifty-four, bald, white-bearded, and
325 red-faced, but still imposing in figure, carriage, and dress. To Elizabeth
326 he was dear as the friend of her youth, one who, she was persuaded, had
327 loved her for herself when they were both thirty years younger, and was
328 still her most devoted and trustworthy servant. Burghley she liked and
329 trusted, and all the more since he had become a more docile instrument of
330 her policy. Walsingham, a keener intellect and more independent character,
331 she could not but value, though impatient under his penetrating suspicion
332 and almost constant disapproval. Leicester was the intimate friend, the
333 frequent companion of her leisure hours. None of her younger favourites had
334 supplanted him in her regard. By long intimacy he knew the &lt;i&gt;molles aditus
335 et tempora&lt;/i&gt; when things might be said without offence which were not
336 acceptable at the council-board. The other ministers were glad to use him
337 for this purpose. There can be no question that his appointment to the
338 command in the Netherlands was meant as the most decisive indication that
339 could be given of Elizabeth's determination to face open war with Philip
340 rather than allow him to establish absolute government in that country. &lt;/p&gt;
341 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Since the deaths of Alençon and William of Orange, the
342 United Provinces had been without a ruler. The government had been
343 provisionally carried on by the &amp;quot;States,&amp;quot; or deputies from each province.
344 Leicester had come with no other title than that of LieutenantGeneral of the
345 Queen's troops. But what the States wanted was not so much a military leader
346 as a sovereign ruler. They therefore urged Leicester to accept the powers
347 and title of Governor-General, the office which had been held by the
348 representatives of Philip. From this it would follow, both logically and
349 practically, that Elizabeth herself stood in the place of Philip--in other
350 words, that she was committed to the sovereignty which she had so
351 peremptorily refused. &lt;/p&gt;
352 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The offer was accepted by Leicester almost immediately after
353 his arrival (14/24 January 1586). There can be little doubt that it was a
354 preconcerted plan between the States and Elizabeth's ministers, who had all
355 along supported the Dutch proposals. Leicester, we know, had contemplated it
356 before leaving England. Davison, who was in Holland, hurried it on, and
357 undertook to carry the news to Elizabeth. Burghley and Walsingham maintained
358 that the step had been absolutely necessary, and implored her not to undo
359 it. Elizabeth herself had suspected that something of the sort would be
360 attempted, and had strictly enjoined Leicester at his departure to accept no
361 such title. It was not that she wished his powers--that is to say, her own
362 powers--to be circumscribed. On the contrary, she desired that they should
363 in practice be as large and absolute as possible. What she objected to was
364 the title, with all the consequences it involved. And what enraged her most
365 of all was the attempt of her servants to push the thing through behind her
366 back, on the calculation that she would be obliged to accept the
367 accomplished fact. Her wrath vented itself on all concerned, on her
368 ministers, on the States, and on Leicester. To the latter she addressed a
369 characteristic letter:-- &lt;/p&gt;
370 &lt;blockquote&gt;
371 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;To my Lord of Leicester from the Queen by Sir Thomas
372 Heneage. &lt;/p&gt;
373 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&amp;quot;How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used
374 by you, you shall by this bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent
375 unto you to charge you withal. We could never have imagined, had we not
376 seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by ourself and
377 extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this land, would
378 have in so contemptible [contemptuous] a sort, broken our commandment, in
379 a cause that so greatly toucheth us in honour; whereof although you have
380 showed yourself to make but little account, in most undutiful a sort, you
381 may not therefore think that we have so little care of the reparation
382 thereof as we mind to pass so great a wrong in silence unredressed. And
383 therefore our express pleasure and command is that, all delays and excuses
384 laid apart, you do presently, on the duty of your allegiance, obey and
385 fulfil whatsoever the bearer hereof shall direct you to do in our name.
386 Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost
387 peril.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
388 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
389 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Nor were these cutting reproaches reserved for his private
390 perusal. She severely rebuked the States for encouraging &amp;quot;a creature of her
391 own&amp;quot; to disobey her injunctions, and, as a reparation from them and from
392 him, she required that he should make a public resignation of the government
393 in the place where he had accepted it. &lt;/p&gt;
394 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It is not to be wondered at that Elizabeth should think the
395 vindication of her outraged authority to be the most pressing requirement of
396 the moment. But the result was unfortunate for the object of the expedition.
397 The States had conferred &amp;quot;absolute&amp;quot; authority upon Leicester, and would have
398 thought it a cheap price to pay if, by their adroit manœuvre, they had
399 succeeded in forcing the Queen's hand. But they did not care to intrust
400 absolute powers to a mere general of an English contingent. After long
401 discussion, Elizabeth was at length persuaded that the least of evils was to
402 allow him to retain the title which the States had conferred on him ( June
403 1586). But in the meantime they had repented of their haste in letting power
404 go out of their own hands. Their efforts were thenceforth directed to
405 explain away the term &amp;quot;absolute.&amp;quot; The long displeasure of the Queen had
406 destroyed the principal value of Leicester in their eye. He himself had soon
407 incurred their dislike. Impetuous and domineering, he could not endure
408 opposition. Every man who did not fall in with his plans was a malicious
409 enemy, a traitor, a tool of Parma, who ought to be hanged. He still enjoyed
410 the favour of the democratic and bigoted Calvinist party, especially in
411 Utrecht, and he tried to play them off against the States, thereby promoting
412 the rise of the factions which long afterwards distracted the United
413 Provinces. The displeasures of the Queen had taken the shape of not sending
414 him money, and his troops were in great distress and unable to move.
415 Moreover, rumours of the secret peace negotiations were craftily spread by
416 Parma, who, knowing well that they would come to nothing, turned them to the
417 best account by leading the States to suspect that they were being betrayed
418 to Spain. &lt;/p&gt;
419 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth had sent her army abroad more as a warning to
420 Philip than with a view to active operations. It was no part of her plan to
421 recover any of the territory already conquered by Parma, even if it had lain
422 in her power. She knew that the majority of its inhabitants were Catholics
423 and royalists. She knew also that Parma's attenuated army was considerably
424 outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch forces, and that he was in dire distress for
425 food and money. The recovered provinces were completely ruined by the war.
426 Their commerce was swept from the sea. The mouths of their great rivers were
427 blockaded. The Protestants of Flanders and Brabant had largely migrated to
428 the unsubdued provinces, whose prosperity, notwithstanding the burdens of
429 war, was advancing by leaps and bounds. Their population was about two
430 millions. That of England itself was little more than four. Religion was no
431 longer the only or the chief motive of their resistance. For even the
432 Catholics among them, who were still very numerous--some said a majority
433 --keenly relished the material prosperity which had grown with independence.
434 Encouraged by English protection, the States were in no humour to listen to
435 compromise. But a compromise was what Elizabeth desired. She was therefore
436 not unwilling that her forces should be confined to an attitude of
437 observation, till it should appear whether her open intervention would
438 extract from Philip such concessions as she deemed reasonable. &lt;/p&gt;
439 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Leicester was eager to get to work, and he was warmly
440 supported by Walsingham. Burghley's conduct was less straightforward. He had
441 long found it advisable to cultivate amicable relations with the favourite.
442 He had probably concurred in the plan for making him Governor-General. Even
443 now he was professing to take his part. In reality he was not sorry to see
444 him under a cloud; and though he sympathised as much as ever with the Dutch,
445 he cared more for crippling his rival. Hence his activity in those obscure
446 peace negotiations which he so carefully concealed from Leicester and
447 Walsingham. To keep Walsingham long in the dark, on that or any other
448 subject, was indeed impossible. It was found necessary at last to let him be
449 present at an interview with the agents employed by Burghley and Parma,
450 which brought their backstairs diplomacy to an abrupt conclusion. &amp;quot;They that
451 have been the employers of them,&amp;quot; he wrote to Leicester, &amp;quot;are ashamed of the
452 matter.&amp;quot; The negotiations went on through other channels, but never made any
453 serious progress. &lt;/p&gt;
454 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;To compel Philip to listen to a compromise, without at the
455 same time emboldening the Dutch to turn a deaf ear to it--such was the
456 problem which Elizabeth had set herself. She therefore preferred to apply
457 pressure in other quarters. Towards the end of 1585, Drake appeared on the
458 coast of Spain itself, and plundered Vigo. Then crossing the Atlantic, he
459 sacked and burned St. Domingo and Carthagena. Again in 1587, he forced his
460 way into Cadiz harbour, burnt all the shipping and the stores collected for
461 the Armada, and for two months plundered and destroyed every vessel he met
462 off the coast of Portugal. &lt;/p&gt;
463 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Philip had so long and so tamely submitted to the many
464 injuries and indignities which Elizabeth heaped upon him, that it is not
465 wonderful if she had come to think that he would never pluck up courage to
466 retaliate. This time she was wrong. The conquest of England had always had
467 its place in his overloaded programme. But it was to be in that hazy
468 ever-receding future, when he should have put down the Dutch rebellion and
469 neutralised France. Elizabeth's open intervention in the Netherlands at
470 length induced him to change his plan. England, he now decided, must be
471 first dealt with. &lt;/p&gt;
472 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;In the meantime, Parma's operations in the Netherlands were
473 starved quite as much as Leicester's. Plundering excursions, two or three
474 petty combats not deserving the name of battles, half-a-dozen small towns
475 captured on one side or the other--such is the military record from the date
476 of Elizabeth's intervention to the arrival of the Armada. Parma had somewhat
477 the best of this work, such as it was. But the war in the Netherlands was
478 practically stagnant. &lt;/p&gt;
479 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;At the end of the first year of Leicester's government,
480 events of the highest importance obliged him to pay a visit to England (
481 Nov. 1586). The Queen of Scots had been found guilty of conspiring to
482 assassinate Elizabeth, and Parliament had been summoned to decide upon her
483 fate. &lt;/p&gt;
484 &lt;/font&gt;
485 &lt;hr&gt;
486 &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;From &lt;i&gt;
487 Queen Elizabeth&lt;/i&gt; by Edward Spencer Beesly.&amp;nbsp; Published in London by
488 Macmillan and Co., 1892.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
489 &lt;/font&gt;
490 &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;
491 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
492&lt;/blockquote&gt;
493
494 &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
495 &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fbeeslychapternine.html&quot;&gt;to Chapter
496 IX: The Execution of the Queen of Scots: 1584-1587&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
497 &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
498 &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fmonarchs%2feliz1.html&quot;&gt;to the Queen
499 Elizabeth I website&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp; /&amp;nbsp;
500 &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2frelative%2fmaryqos.html&quot;&gt;to the Mary,
501 queen of Scots website&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
502 &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;href=http:%2f%2fenglishhistory.net%2ftudor%2fsecondary.html&quot;&gt;
503 to Secondary Sources&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
504 &lt;/font&gt;
505
506
507
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510</Content>
511</Section>
512</Archive>
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