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14    <Metadata name="Content">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
15    <Metadata name="Page_topic">biography of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892</Metadata>
16    <Metadata name="Author">Marilee Mongello</Metadata>
17    <Metadata name="Title">Secondary Sources: Queen Elizabeth by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892: Chapter X</Metadata>
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31&lt;table border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;3&quot; width=&quot;100%&quot; height=&quot;667&quot;&gt;
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45    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;7&quot;&gt;Queen Elizabeth&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
46    &lt;font size=&quot;4&quot;&gt;by Edward Spencer Beesly, 1892&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
47    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
48    &lt;img border=&quot;2&quot; src=&quot;_httpdocimg_/eliz1-ermine.jpg&quot; width=&quot;400&quot; height=&quot;478&quot; alt=&quot;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas Hilliard&quot;&gt;&lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
49    &lt;i&gt;&lt;font size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;'The Ermine Portrait' of Elizabeth I, c1585, by Nicholas
50    Hilliard;&lt;br&gt;from the &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=0&amp;amp;;&gt;Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I&lt;/a&gt; website&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
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55  &lt;blockquote&gt;
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63    &lt;div align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;
64      &lt;b&gt;CHAPTER X&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br&gt;
65      &lt;b&gt;WAR WITH SPAIN: 1587-1603&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
66    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;ELIZABETH is not seen at her best in war. She did not easily
67    resign herself to its sacrifices. It frightened her to see the money which
68    she had painfully put together, pound by pound, during so many years, by
69    many a small economy, draining out at the rate of £17,000 a month into the
70    bottomless pit of military expenditure. When Leicester came back she simply
71    stopped all remittances to the Netherlands, making sure that if she did not
72    feed her soldiers some one else would have to do it. She saw that Parma was
73    not pressing forward. And though rumours of the enormous preparations in
74    Spain, which accounted for his inactivity, continued to pour in, she still
75    hoped that her intervention in the Netherlands was bending Philip to
76    concessions. All this time Parma was steadily carrying out his master's
77    plans for the invasion. His little army was to be trebled in the autumn by
78    reinforcements principally from Italy. In the meantime he was collecting a
79    flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. As soon as the Armada should appear they
80    were to make the passage under its protection. &lt;/p&gt;
81    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It would answer no useful purpose, even if my limits
82    permitted it, to enter into the particulars of Elizabeth's policy towards
83    the United Provinces during the twelve months that preceded the appearance
84    of the Armada. Her proceedings were often tortuous, and by setting them
85    forth in minute detail her detractors have not found it difficult to
86    represent them as treacherous. But, living three centuries later, what have
87    we to consider but the general scope and drift of her policy? Looking at it
88    as a whole we shall find that, whether we approve of it or not, it was
89    simple, consistent, and undisguised. She had no intention of abandoning the
90    Provinces to Philip, still less of betraying them. But she did wish them to
91    return to their allegiance, if she could procure for them proper guarantees
92    for such liberties as they had been satisfied with before Philip's tyranny
93    began. If Philip had been wise he would have made those concessions.
94    Elizabeth is not to be over-much blamed if she clung too long to the belief
95    that he could be persuaded or compelled to do what was so much for his own
96    interest. If she was deceived so was Burghley. Walsingham is entitled to the
97    credit of having from first to last refused to believe that the negotiations
98    were anything but a blind. &lt;/p&gt;
99    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Though Elizabeth desired peace, she did not cease to deal
100    blows at Philip. In the spring of 1587 (April-June), while she was most
101    earnestly pushing her negotiations with Parma, she despatched Drake on a new
102    expedition to the Spanish coast. He forced his way into the harbours of
103    Cadiz and Corunna, destroyed many ships and immense stores, and came back
104    loaded with plunder. The Armada had not been crippled, for most of the ships
105    that were to compose it were lying in the Tagus. But the concentration had
106    been delayed. Fresh stores had to be collected. Drake calculated, and as it
107    proved rightly, that another season at least would be consumed in repairing
108    the loss, and that England, for that summer and autumn, could rest secure of
109    invasion. &lt;/p&gt;
110    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The delay was most unwelcome to Philip. The expense of
111    keeping such a fleet and army on foot through the winter would be enormous.
112    Spain was maintaining not only the Armada but the army of Parma; for the
113    resources of the Netherlands, which had been the true El Dorado of the
114    Spanish monarchy, were completely dried up. So impatient was Philip
115    --usually the slowest of men--that he proposed to despatch the Armada even
116    in September, and actually wrote to Parma that he might expect it at any
117    moment. But, as Drake had calculated, September was gone before everything
118    was ready. The naval experts protested against the rashness of facing the
119    autumnal gales, with no friendly harbour on either side of the Channel in
120    which to take refuge. Philip then made the absurd suggestion that the army
121    from the Netherlands should cross by itself in its flat-bottomed boats. But
122    Parma told him that it was absolutely out of the question. Four English
123    ships could sink the whole flotilla. In the meantime his soldiers, waiting
124    on the Dunkirk Downs and exposed to the severities of the weather, were
125    dying off like flies. Philip and Elizabeth resembled one another in this,
126    that neither of them had any personal experience of war either by land or
127    sea. For a Queen this was natural. For a King it was unnatural, and for an
128    ambitious King unprecedented. They did not understand the proper adaptation
129    of means to ends. Yet it was necessary to obtain their sanction before
130    anything could be done. Hence there was much mismanagement on both sides.
131    Still England was in no real danger during the summer and autumn of 1587,
132    because Philip's preparations were not completed; and before the end of the
133    year the English fleet was lying in the Channel. But the Queen grudged the
134    expense of keeping the crews up to their full complement. The supply of
135    provisions and ammunition was also very inadequate. The expensiveness of war
136    is generally a sufficient reason for not going to war; but to attempt to do
137    war cheaply is always unwise. &amp;quot;Sparing and war,&amp;quot; as Effingham observed,
138    &amp;quot;have no affinity together.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
139    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Drake strongly urged that, instead of trying to guard the
140    Channel, the English fleet should make for the coast of Spain, and boldly
141    assail the Armada as soon as it put to sea. This was the advice of a man who
142    had all the shining qualities of Nelson, and seems to have been in no
143    respect his inferior. It was no counsel of desperation. He was confident of
144    success. Lord Howard of Effingham, the Admiral, was of the same opinion. The
145    negotiations were odious to him. For Burghley, who clings to them, he has no
146    more reverence than Hamlet had for Polonius. &amp;quot;Since England was England,&amp;quot; he
147    writes to Walsingham, &amp;quot;there was never such a stratagem and mask to deceive
148    her as this treaty of peace. I pray God that we do not curse for this a long
149    grey beard with a white head witless, that will make all the world think us
150    heartless. You know whom I mean.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
151    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;With the hopes and fears of these sea-heroes, it is
152    instructive to compare the forecast of the great soldier who was to conduct
153    the invasion. Always obedient and devoted to his sovereign, Parma played his
154    part in the deceptive negotiations with consummate skill. But his own
155    opinion was that it would be wise to negotiate in good faith and accept the
156    English terms. Though prepared to undertake the invasion, he took a very
157    serious view of the risks to be encountered. He tells Philip that the
158    English preparations are formidable both by land and sea. Even if the
159    passage should be safely accomplished, disembarkation would be difficult.
160    His army, reduced by the hardships of the winter from 30,000 men, which he
161    had estimated as the proper number, to less than 17,000, was dangerously
162    small for the work expected of it. He would have to fight battle after
163    battle, and the further he advanced the weaker would his army become both
164    from losses and from the necessity of protecting his communications. &lt;/p&gt;
165    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Parma had carefully informed himself of the preparations in
166    England. From the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, attention had been paid to
167    the organisation, training, and equipment of the militia, and especially
168    since the relations with Spain had become more hostile. On paper it seems to
169    have amounted to 117,000 men. Mobilisation was a local business. Sir John
170    Norris drew up the plan of defence. Beacon fires did the work of the
171    telegraph. Every man knew whither he was to repair when their blaze should
172    be seen. The districts to be abandoned, the positions to be defended, the
173    bridges to be broken, were all marked out. Three armies, calculated to
174    amount in the aggregate to 73,000 men, were ordered to assemble in July.
175    Whether so many were actually mustered is doubtful. But Parma would
176    certainly have found himself confronted by forces vastly superior in numbers
177    to his own, and would have had, as he said, to fight battle after battle.
178    The bow had not been entirely abandoned, but the greater part of the
179    archers--two-thirds in some counties--had lately been armed with calivers.
180    What was wanting in discipline would have been to some extent made up by the
181    spontaneous cohesion of a force organised under its natural leaders, the
182    nobles and gentry of each locality, not a few of whom had seen service
183    abroad. But, after all, the greatest element of strength was the free spirit
184    of the people. England was, and had long been, a nation of freemen. There
185    were a few peers, and a great many knights and gentlemen. But there was no
186    noble caste, as on the Continent, separated by an impassable barrier of
187    birth and privilege from the mass of the people. All felt themselves
188    fellow-countrymen bound together by common sentiments, common interests, and
189    mutual respect. &lt;/p&gt;
190    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;This spirit of freedom--one might almost say of
191    equality--made itself felt still more in the navy, and goes far to account
192    for the cheerful energy and dash with which every service was performed.
193    &amp;quot;The English officers lived on terms of sympathy with their men unknown to
194    the Spaniards, who raised between the commander and the commanded absurd
195    barriers of rank and blood which forbade to his pride any labour but that of
196    fighting. Drake touched the true mainspring of English success when he once
197    (in his voyage round the world) indignantly rebuked some coxcomb
198    gentlemen-adventurers with, 'I should like to see the gentleman that will
199    refuse to set his hand to a rope. I must have the gentlemen to hale and draw
200    with the mariners.&amp;quot; Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher were all born of humble
201    parents. They rose by their own valour and capacity. They had gentlemen of
202    birth serving under them. To Howard and Cumberland and Seymour they were
203    brothers-in-arms. The master of every little trading vessel was fired by
204    their example, and hoped to climb as high. &lt;/p&gt;
205    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It is the pleasure of some writers to speak of Elizabeth's
206    naval preparations as disgracefully insufficient, and to treat the
207    triumphant result as a sort of miracle. To their apprehension, indeed, her
208    whole reign is one long interference by Providence with the ordinary
209    relations of cause and effect. The number of royal ships as compared with
210    those of private owners in the fleet which met the great Armada-34 to
211    161--is represented as discreditably small. By Englishmen of that day, it
212    was considered to be. creditably large. Sir Edward Coke (who was thirtyeight
213    at the time of the Armada), writing under Charles I., when the royal navy
214    was much larger, says: &amp;quot;In the reign of Queen Elizabeth (I being then
215    acquainted with this business) there were thirty-three [royal ships] besides
216    pinnaces, which so guarded and regarded the navigation of the merchants, as
217    they had safe vent for their commodities, and trade and traffic flourished.&amp;quot;&lt;a onclick=&quot;return pageTxt_href_onClick(this,true);&quot; href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;;&gt;
218    &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
219    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It seems to be overlooked that the royal navy, such as it
220    was, was almost the creation of Elizabeth. Her father was the first English
221    king who made any attempt to keep a standing navy of his own. He established
222    the Admiralty and the first royal dockyard. Under Edward and Mary the navy,
223    like everything else, went to ruin. Elizabeth's ship-building, humble as it
224    seems to us, excited the admiration of her subjects, and was regarded as one
225    of the chief advances of her reign. The ships, when not in commission, were
226    kept in the Medway. The Queen personally paid the greatest attention to
227    them. They were always kept in excellent condition, and could be fitted out
228    for sea at very short notice. Economy was enforced in this, as in other
229    departments, but not at the expense of efficiency. The wages of officers and
230    men were very much augmented; but in the short periods for which crews were
231    enlisted, and in the victualling, there seems to have been unwise parsimony
232    in 1588. The grumbling of alarmists about unpreparedness, apathy,
233    stinginess, and red-tape was precisely what it is in our own day. We know
234    that some allowance is to be made for it. &lt;/p&gt;
235    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The movements of the Armada were perfectly well known in
236    England, and all the dispositions to meet it at sea were completed in a
237    leisurely manner. Conferences were still going on at Ostend between English
238    and Spanish commissioners. On the part of Elizabeth there was sincerity, but
239    not blind credulity nor any disposition to make unworthy concessions.
240    Conferences quite as protracted have often been held between belligerents
241    while hostilities were being actively carried on. The large majority of
242    Englishmen were resolved to fight to the death against any invader. But, as
243    against Spain, there was not that eager pugnacity which a war with France
244    always called forth, except, perhaps, among the sea-rovers; and even they
245    would have contented themselves, if it had been possible, with the
246    unrecognized privateering which had so long given them the profits of war
247    with the immunities of peace. The rest of the nation respected their Queen
248    for her persevering endeavour to find a way of reconciliation with an
249    ancient ally, and to limit, in the meantime, the area of hostilities. They
250    were confident, and with good reason, that she would surrender no important
251    interest, and that aggressive designs would be met, as they had always been
252    met, more than half-way. &lt;/p&gt;
253    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The story of the great victory is too well known to need
254    repetition here. But some comments are necessary. It is usual, for one
255    reason or other, to exaggerate the disparity of the opposing fleets, and to
256    represent England as only saved from impending ruin by the extraordinary
257    daring of her seamen, and a series of fortunate accidents. The final
258    destruction of the Armada, after the pursuit was over, was certainly the
259    work of wind and sea. But if we fairly weigh the available strength on each
260    side, we shall see that the English commanders might from the first feel, as
261    they did feel, a reasonable assurance of defeating the invaders. &lt;/p&gt;
262    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Let us first compare the strength of the fleets: &lt;i&gt;--I will
263    insert this graphic as soon as possible--Marilee&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
264    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The Armada carried besides 21,855 soldiers. The first thing
265    that strikes us is the immense preponderance in tonnage on the part of the
266    Spaniards, and in sailors on the part of the English. This really goes far
267    to explain the result. Nothing is more certain than that the Spanish ships,
268    notwithstanding their superior size, were for fighting and sailing purposes
269    very inferior to the English. It had always been believed that, to withstand
270    the heavy seas of the Atlantic, a ship should be constructed like a lofty
271    fortress. The English builders were introducing lower and longer hulls and a
272    greater spread of canvas. Their crews, as has always been the case in oar
273    navy, were equally handy as sailors and gunners. The Spanish ships were
274    under-manned. The soldiers were not accustomed to work the guns, and were of
275    no use unless it came to boarding, which Howard ordered his captains to
276    avoid. The English guns, if fewer than the Spanish, were heavier and worked
277    by more practised men. Their balls not only cut up the rigging of the
278    Spaniards but tore their hulls (which were supposed to be cannon-proof),
279    while the English ships were hardly touched. The slaughter among the
280    wretched soldiers crowded between decks was terrible. Blood was seen pouring
281    out of the leescuppers. &amp;quot;The English ships,&amp;quot; says a Spanish officer, &amp;quot;were
282    under such good management that they did with them what they pleased.&amp;quot; The
283    work was done almost entirely by the Queen's ships.&amp;quot; If you had seen,&amp;quot; says
284    Sir William Winter, &amp;quot;the simple service done by the merchants and coast
285    ships, you would have said we had been little helped by them, otherwise than
286    that they did make a show.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
287    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The principal and final battle was fought off Gravelines.
288    &lt;/font&gt;
289    &lt;/font&gt;
290    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
291    The Armada therefore did arrive at its destination, but only to show that
292    the general plan of the invasion was an impracticable one. The superiority
293    in tonnage and number of guns on the morning of that day, though not what it
294    had been when the fighting began a week before, was still immense, if
295    superiority in those particulars had been of any use. But with this battle
296    the plan of Philip was finally shattered. So far from being in a condition
297    to cover Parma's passage, the Spanish admiral was glad to escape as best he
298    could from the English pursuit. &lt;/p&gt;
299    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;During the eight days' fight, be it observed, the Armada had
300    experienced no unfavourable weather or other stroke of ill-fortune. The wind
301    had been mostly in the west, and not tempestuous. After the last battle,
302    when the crippled Spanish ships were drifting upon the Dutch shoals, it
303    opportunely shifted, and enabled them to escape into the North Sea. &lt;/p&gt;
304    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;It would not be easy to find any great naval engagement in
305    which the victors suffered so little. In the last battle, when they came to
306    close quarters, they had about sixty killed. During the first seven days
307    their loss seems to have been almost nil. One vessel only-not belonging to
308    the Queen--became entangled among the enemy, and succumbed. Except the
309    master of this vessel not one of the captains was killed from first to last.
310    Many men of rank were serving in the fleet. It
311    &lt;/font&gt;
312    &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif&quot;&gt;
313    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
314    is not mentioned that one of them was so much as wounded. &lt;/p&gt;
315    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Looking at all these facts, we can surely come to only one
316    conclusion. Philip's plan was hopeless from the first. Barring accidents,
317    the English were bound to win. On no other occasion in our history was our
318    country so well prepared to meet her enemies. Never was her safety from
319    invasion so amply guaranteed. The defeat of the Great Armada was the
320    deserved and crowning triumph of thirty years of good government at home and
321    wise policy abroad; of careful provision for defence and sober abstinence
322    from adventure and aggression. &lt;/p&gt;
323    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Of the land preparations it is impossible to speak with
324    equal confidence, as they were never put to the test. If the Spaniards had
325    landed, Leicester's militia would no doubt have experienced a bloody defeat.
326    London might have been taken and plundered. But Parma himself never expected
327    to become master of the country without the aid of a great Catholic rising.
328    This, we may affirm with confidence, would not have taken place on even the
329    smallest scale. Overwhelming forces would soon have gathered round the
330    Spaniards. They would probably have retired to the coast, and there
331    fortified some place from which it would have been difficult to dislodge
332    them as long as they retained the command of the sea. &lt;/p&gt;
333    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Such seems to have been the utmost success which, in the
334    most favourable event, could have attended the invasion. A great disaster,
335    no doubt, for England, and one for which Elizabeth would have been judged by
336    history with more severity than justice; for Englishmen have always chosen
337    to risk it, down to our own time.(1) No government which insisted on making
338    adequate provision for the military defence of the country would have been
339    tolerated then, or, to all appearance, would be tolerated now. We have
340    always trusted to our navy. It were to be wished that our naval superiority
341    were as assured now as when we defeated the Armada. &lt;/p&gt;
342    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The arrangements for feeding the soldiers and sailors were
343    very defective. A praiseworthy system of control had been introduced to
344    check waste and peculation in time of peace. Of course it did not easily
345    adapt itself to the exigencies of war. Military operations are sure to
346    suffer where a certain, or rather uncertain, amount of waste and peculation
347    is not risked. We have not forgotten the &amp;quot;horrible and heart-rending&amp;quot;
348    sufferings of our army in the Crimea, which, like those of Elizabeth's
349    fleet, had to be relieved by private effort. In the sixteenth century the
350    lot of the soldier and sailor everywhere was want and disease, varied at
351    intervals by plunder and excess. Philip's soldiers and sailors were worse
352    off than Elizabeth's, though he grudged no money for purposes of war. &lt;/p&gt;
353    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Those who profess to be scandalised by the appointment of
354    Leicester to the command of the army should point out what fitter choice
355    could have been made. He was the only great nobleman with any military
356    experience; and to suppose that any one but a great nobleman could have been
357    appointed to such a command is to show a profound ignorance of the ideas of
358    the time. He had Sir John Norris, a really able soldier, as his marshal of
359    the camp. After all, no one has alleged that he did not do his duty with
360    energy and intelligence. The story that the Queen thought of making him her
361    &amp;quot;Lieutenant in the government of England and Ireland,&amp;quot; but was dissuaded
362    from it by Burghley and Hatton, rests on no authority but that of Camden,
363    who is fond of repeating spiteful gossip about Leicester. No sensible person
364    will believe that she meant to create a sort of Grand Vizier. She may have
365    thought of making him what we should call &amp;quot;Commander-in-Chief.&amp;quot; There would
366    be much to say for such a concentration of authority while the kingdom was
367    threatened with invasion. The title of &amp;quot;Lieutenant&amp;quot; was a purely military
368    one, and began to be applied under the Tudors to the commanders of the
369    militia in each county. Leicester's title for the time was &amp;quot;Lieutenant and
370    Captain-General of the Queen's armies and companies.&amp;quot; But we find him
371    complaining to Walsingham that the patent of Hunsdon, the commander of the
372    Midland army, gave him independent powers. &amp;quot;I shall have wrong if he
373    absolutely command where my patent doth give me power. You may easily
374    conceive what absurd dealings are likely to fall out if you allow two
375    absolute commanders&amp;quot; (28 July). Camden's story is probably a confused echo
376    of this dispute. &lt;/p&gt;
377    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Writers who are loth to admit that the trust, the gratitude,
378    the enthusiastic loyalty which Elizabeth inspired were the first and most
379    important cause of the great victory, have sought to belittle the grandest
380    moment of her life by pointing out that the famous speech at Tilbury was
381    made after the battle of Gravelines. But the dispersal of the Armada by the
382    storm of August 5th was not yet known in England. Drake, writing on the 8th
383    and 10th, thinks that it is gone to Denmark to refit, and begs the Queen not
384    to diminish any of her forces. The occasion of the speech on the 10th seems
385    to have been the arrival of a post on that day, while the Queen was at
386    dinner in Leicester's tent, with a false alarm that Parma had embarked all
387    his forces, and might be expected in England immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
388    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;But the Lieutenant-General had reached the end of his
389    career. Three weeks after the Tilbury review he died of &amp;quot;a continued fever,&amp;quot;
390    at the age of fifty-six. He kept Elizabeth's regard to the last, because she
391    believed--and during the latter part of his life, not wrongly--in his
392    fidelity and devotion. There is no sign that she at any time valued his
393    judgment or suffered him to sway her policy, except so far as he was the
394    mouthpiece of abler advisers; nor did she ever allow his enmities, violent
395    as they were, to prejudice her against any of her other servants. His
396    fortune was no doubt much above his deserts, and he has paid the usual
397    penalty. There are few personages in history about whom so much malicious
398    nonsense has been written. &lt;/p&gt;
399    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;We cannot help looking on England as placed in a quite new
400    position by the defeat of the Armada--a position of security and
401    independence. In truth, what was changed was not so much the relative
402    strength of England and Spain as the opinion of it held by Englishmen and
403    Spaniards, and indeed by all Europe. The loss to Philip in mere ships, men,
404    and treasure was no doubt considerable. But his inability to conquer England
405    was demonstrated rather than caused by the destruction of the Armada. Philip
406    himself talked loftily about &amp;quot;placing another fleet upon the seas.&amp;quot; But his
407    subjects began to see that defence, not conquest, was now their
408    business--and had been for some time if they had only known it: &lt;/p&gt;
409    &lt;blockquote&gt;
410      &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Cervi, luporum preda rapacium,&lt;br&gt;
411      Sectamur ultro quos opimus&lt;br&gt;
412      Fallere et effugere eat triumphus&lt;/i&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
413    &lt;/blockquote&gt;
414    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth's attitude to Philip underwent a marked change.
415    Till then she had been unwilling to abandon the hope of a peaceful
416    settlement. She had dealt him not a few stinging blows, but always with a
417    certain restraint and forbearance, because they were meant for the purpose
418    of bringing him to reason. Thirty years of patience on his part had led her
419    to believe that he would never carry retaliation beyond assassination plots.
420    At last, in his slow way, he had gathered up all his strength and essayed to
421    crush her. Thenceforward she was a convert to Drake's doctrine that attack
422    was the surest way of defence. She had still good reasons for devolving this
423    work as much as possible on the private enterprise of her subjects. The
424    burden fell on those who asked nothing better than to be allowed to bear it.
425    Thus arose that system, or rather practice, of leaving national work to be
426    executed by private enterprise, which has had so much to do with the
427    building up of the British Empire. Private gain has been the mainspring of
428    action. National defence and aggrandisement have been almost incidental
429    results. With Elizabeth herself national and private aims could not be
430    dissevered. The nation and she had but one purse. She was cheaply defending
431    England, and she shared in the plunder. &lt;/p&gt;
432    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The favourite cruising-ground of the English adventurers was
433    off the Azores, where the Spanish treasure fleets always halted for fresh
434    water and provisions, on their way to Europe. Some of these expeditions were
435    on a large scale. But they were not so successful or profitable, in
436    proportion to their size, as the smaller ventures of Drake and Hawkins
437    earlier in the reign. The Spaniards were everywhere on the alert. The
438    harbours of the New World, which formerly lay in careless security, were put
439    into a state of defence. Treasure fleets made their voyages with more
440    caution. &amp;quot;Not a grain of gold, silver, or pearl, but what must be got
441    through the fire.&amp;quot; The day of great prizes was gone by. &lt;/p&gt;
442    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Two of these expeditions are distinguished by their
443    importance. The first was a joint-stock venture of Drake and Norris--the
444    foremost sailor and the foremost soldier among Englishmen of that day--in
445    the year after the great Armada (April 1589). They and some private backers
446    found most of the capital. The Queen contributed six royal ships and
447    £20,000. This fleet carried no less than 11,000 soldiers, for the aim was to
448    wrest Portugal from the Spaniard and set up Don Antonio, a representative of
449    the dethroned dynasty. &lt;/p&gt;
450    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Stopping on their way at Corunna, they took the lower town,
451    destroyed large stores, and defeated in the field a much superior force
452    marching to the relief of the place. Norris mined and breached the walls of
453    the upper town; but the storming parties having been repulsed with great
454    loss, the army re-embarked and pursued its voyage. Landing at Peniché,
455    Norris marched fifty miles by Vimiero and Torres Vedras, names famous
456    afterwards in the military annals of England, and on the seventh day arrived
457    before Lisbon. But he had no battering train; for Drake, who had brought the
458    fleet round to the mouth of the Tagus, judged it dangerous to enter the
459    river. Nor did the Portuguese rise, as had been hoped. The army therefore,
460    marching through the suburbs of Lisbon, rejoined the fleet at Cascaes, and
461    proceeded to Vigo. That town was burnt, and the surrounding country
462    plundered. This was the last exploit of the expedition. Great loss and
463    dishonour had been inflicted on Spain; but no less than half of the soldiers
464    and sailors had perished by disease; and the booty, though said to have been
465    large, was a disappointment to the survivors. &lt;/p&gt;
466    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The other great expedition was in 1596. The capture of
467    Calais in April of that year by the Spaniards, had renewed the alarm of
468    invasion, and it was determined to meet the danger at a distance from home.
469    A great fleet, with 6000 soldiers on board, commanded by Essex and Howard of
470    Effingham sailed straight to Cadiz, the principal port and arsenal of Spain.
471    The harbour was forced by the fleet, the town and castle stormed by the
472    army, several men-of-war taken or destroyed, a large merchant-fleet burnt,
473    together with an immense quantity of stores and merchandise; the total value
474    being estimated at twenty millions of ducats. This was by far the heaviest
475    blow inflicted by England upon Spain during the reign, and was so regarded
476    in Europe; for though the great Armada had been signally defeated by the
477    English fleet, its subsequent destruction was due to the winds and waves.
478    Essex was vehemently desirous to hold Cadiz; but Effingham and the Council
479    of War appointed by the Queen would not hear of it. The expedition
480    accordingly returned home, having effectually relieved England from the fear
481    of invasion. The burning of Penzance by four Spanish galleys (1595) was not
482    much to set against these great successes. &lt;/p&gt;
483    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;One reason for the comparative impunity with which the
484    English assailed the unwieldy empire of Philip was the insane pursuit of the
485    French crown, to which he devoted all his resources after the murder of
486    Henry III. In 1598, with one foot in the grave, and no longer able to
487    conceal from himself that, with the exception of the conquest of Portugal,
488    all the ambitious schemes of his life had failed, he was fain to conclude
489    the peace of Vervins with Henry IV. Henry was ready to insist that England
490    and the United Provinces should be comprehended in the treaty. Philip
491    offered terms which Elizabeth would have welcomed ten years earlier. He
492    proposed that the whole of the Low Countries should be constituted a
493    separate sovereignty under his son-in-law the Archduke Albert. The Dutch,
494    who were prospering in war as well as in trade, scouted the offer. English
495    feeling was divided. There was a war-party headed by Essex and Raleigh,
496    personally bitter enemies, but both athirst for glory, conquest, and empire,
497    believing in no right but that of the strongest, greedy for wealth, and
498    disdaining the slower, more laborious, and more legitimate modes of
499    acquiring it. They were tired of campaigning it in France and the Low
500    Countries, where hard knocks and beggarly plunder were all that a soldier
501    had to look to. They proposed to carry a great English army across the
502    Atlantic, to occupy permanently the isthmus of Panama, and from that central
503    position to wrestle with the Spaniard for the trade and plunder of the New
504    World. The peace party held that these ambitious schemes would bring no
505    profit except possibly to a few individuals; that the treasury would be
506    exhausted and the country irritated by taxation and the pressing of
507    soldiers; that to re-establish the old commercial intercourse with Spain
508    would be more reputable and attended with more solid advantage to the nation
509    at large; and finally, that the English arms would be much better employed
510    in a thorough conquest of Ireland. These were the views of Burghley; and
511    they were strongly supported by Buckhurst, the best of the younger statesmen
512    who now surrounded Elizabeth. &lt;/p&gt;
513    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Elizabeth always encouraged her ministers to speak their
514    minds; but, as Buckhurst said on this occasion, &amp;quot;when they have done their
515    extreme duty she wills what she wills.&amp;quot; She determined to maintain the
516    treaty of 1585 with the Dutch. but she took the opportunity of getting it
517    amended in such a way as to throw upon them a larger share of the expenses
518    of the war, and to provide more definitely for the ultimate repayment of her
519    advances. &lt;/p&gt;
520    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;We have seen that three years before the Armada Elizabeth
521    had lost the French alliance, which had till then been the key-stone of her
522    policy. Since then, though aware that Henry III. wished her well, and that
523    he would thwart the Spanish faction as much as he dared, she had not been
524    able to count on him. He might at any moment be pushed by Guise into an
525    attack on England, either with or without the concurrence of Spain. The
526    accession, therefore, of Henry IV. afforded her great relief. In him she had
527    a sure ally. It is true that, like her other allies the Dutch, he was more
528    in a condition to require help than to afford it. But the more work she
529    provided for Philip in Holland or France, the safer England would be. The
530    armies of the Holy League might be formidable to Henry; but as long as he
531    could hold them at bay they were not dangerous to England. She had never
532    quite got over her scruple about helping the Dutch against their lawful
533    sovereign. But Henry IV. was the legitimate King of France, and she could
534    heartily aid him to put down his rebels. From 2000 to 5000 English troops
535    were therefore constantly serving in France down to the peace of Vervins.
536    &lt;/p&gt;
537    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;Philip, in defiance of the Salic law, claimed the crown of
538    France for his daughter in right of her mother, who was a sister of Henry
539    III. To Brittany he alleged that she had a special claim, as being descended
540    from Anne of Brittany, which the Bourbons were not. Brittany, therefore, he
541    invaded at once by sea. Elizabeth, alarmed by the proximity of this Spanish
542    force, desired that her troops in France should be employed in expelling it,
543    and that they should be vigorously supported by Henry IV. Henry, on the
544    other hand, was always drawing away the English to serve his more pressing
545    needs in other parts of France. This brought upon him many harsh rebukes and
546    threats from the English Queen. But she had, for the first time, met her
547    match. He judged, and rightly, that she would not desert him. So, with
548    oft-repeated apologies, light promises, and well-turned compliments, he just
549    went on doing what suited him best, getting all the fighting he could out of
550    the English, and airily eluding Elizabeth's repeated demands for some coast
551    town, which could be held, like Brill and Flushing, as a security for her
552    heavy subsidies. &lt;/p&gt;
553    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;When Henry was reconciled to the Catholic Church, Elizabeth
554    went through the form of expressing surprise and regret at a step which she
555    must have long expected, and must have felt to be wise (1593). Her alliance
556    with Henry was not shaken. It was drawn even closer by a new treaty, each
557    sovereign engaging not to make peace without the consent of the other. This
558    engagement did not prevent Henry from concluding the separate peace of
559    Vervins five years later, when he judged that his interest required it
560    (1598). Elizabeth's dissatisfaction was, this time, genuine enough. But
561    Henry was no longer her protégé, a homeless, landless, penniless king,
562    depending on English subsidies, roaming over the realm he called his own
563    with a few thousands, or sometimes hundreds, of undisciplined cavaliers, who
564    gathered and dispersed at their own pleasure. He was master of a re-united
565    France, and could no longer be either patronised or threatened. Elizabeth
566    might expostulate, and declare that &amp;quot;if there was such a sin as that against
567    the Holy Ghost it must needs be ingratitude:&amp;quot; gratitude was a sentiment to
568    which she was as much a stranger as Henry. The only difference between them
569    was the national one: the Englishwoman preached; the Frenchman mocked. What
570    made her so sore was that he had, so to speak, stolen her policy from her.
571    His predecessor had always suspected her--and with good reason--of intending
572    &amp;quot;to draw her neck out of the collar&amp;quot; if once she could induce him to
573    undertake a joint war. The joint war had at length been undertaken by Henry
574    IV., and it was he who had managed to slip out of it first, while Elizabeth,
575    who longed for peace, was obliged to stand by the Dutch. &lt;/p&gt;
576    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;The two sovereigns, however, knew their own interests too
577    well to quarrel. Henry gave Elizabeth to understand that his designs against
578    Spain had undergone no change; he was only halting for breath; he would help
579    the Dutch underhand--just what she used to say to Henry III. She had now to
580    deal with a French King as sagacious as herself, and a great deal more
581    prompt and vigorous in action; not the man to be made a cat's-paw by any
582    one. She had to accept him as a partner, if not on her own terms, then on
583    his. Both sovereigns were thoroughly veracious--in Carlyle's sense of the
584    word. That is to say, their policy was determined not by passion, or vanity,
585    or sentiment of any kind, but by enlightened self-interest, and was
586    therefore calculable by those who knew how to calculate. &lt;/p&gt;
587    &lt;/font&gt;
588    &lt;hr&gt;
589    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot;&gt;
590    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Notes: &lt;/b&gt;1.
591    &lt;/font&gt;
592    &lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot;&gt;The Earl of Sussex, after
593    inspecting the preparations for defence in Hampshire towards the end of
594    1587, writes to the Council that he had found nothing ready. The &amp;quot;better
595    sort&amp;quot; said, &amp;quot;We are much charged many ways, and when the enemy comes we will
596    provide for him; but he will not come yet.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;
597    &lt;/font&gt;
598    &lt;p align=&quot;left&quot;&gt;&lt;font style=&quot;font-family: Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;From &lt;i&gt;
599    Queen Elizabeth&lt;/i&gt; by Edward Spencer Beesly.&amp;nbsp; Published in London by
600    Macmillan and Co., 1892.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
601    &lt;/font&gt;
602    &lt;font face=&quot;Times New Roman&quot; size=&quot;2&quot;&gt;
603  &lt;/blockquote&gt;
606    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
607    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;;&gt;to Chapter
608    XI: Domestic Affairs: 1588-1601&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
609    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
610    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;;&gt;to the Queen
611    Elizabeth I website&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp; /&amp;nbsp;
612    &lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;;&gt;to the Mary,
613    queen of Scots website&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
614    &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;_httpextlink_&amp;amp;rl=1&amp;amp;;&gt;
615    to Secondary Sources&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
616    &lt;/font&gt;
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